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This thesis argues two issues: William James' 
philosophy was-to a great extent derived from his interaction 
with the French philosophers, Charles Renouvier, Henri 
Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile Boutroux. Correlative to 




relationship with one another, I also argue that in order to 
understand James, he must be placed within the context of 
these relations. These five philosophers, as a group, can be 
clearly seen and understood in the context of an identifiable 
movement. Each one was a part of a whole reality with their 
own slightly different perspectives. However, the context 
that I present reveals the motivating factors of this 
movement towards a philosophy of action. This is not to say 
that there was one defined philosophy of action. Each 
contributed to the conception of a philosophy of action by 
their response to the same dilemmas of their time. 
The challenge science presented to religious experience 
created the 19th Century conflict between science and 
religion. The activities of the Action Francaise, Catholic 
Modernists and Neo-Thomists illustrate responses that sought 
to account for the relation between the physical and the 
metaphysical. The intrusion of scientism into philosophic 
discourse and the use of philosophy as a political tool 
threatened intellectual freedom and stimulated the 
formulation of an alternative conception of philosophy held 
in common by James and these four French philosophers. 
James participated in this movement to invigorate and 
broaden philosophic inquiry. James rejected the idea of 
scientific knowledge confined to strictly logical procedures. 
James and these French philosophers put forward the idea of 
3 
rational inquiry designed to accommodate the irrational in 
experience. To do so required a new foundation for 
philosophy, which they found by an analysis of experience 
that revealed the common component in all human experience to 
be action, which includes the will and intelligence. From 
this view, there are no guarantees nor absolute truths. The 
amount of good existing would be in proportion to the amount 
of effort expended. The pursuit of knowledge as an activity 
includes the human will. Knowledge, then, includes a 
subjective element that places it within political 
relationships. Because of the nature of human inquiry, a 
check on unwarranted assertions could be in force by 
tailoring a method appropriate for each object of 
investigation that insures the ability to speak in terms of 
the reality investigated. 
It is clear from their correspondence and works that 
these five philosophers had a symbiotic relationship. The 
designation "philosophy of action" means that they each 
developed a philosophical viewpoint that rejected the closed, 
fixed systems based on a conception of external verification, 
and adopted a conception of the intrinsic source of knowledge 
found within the relations of man and his environment that 
supported an open-ended, pluralistic, idealistic, empirical 
philosophy. The influence of these French philosophers on 
James is seen in his adoption of free will, his inclusion of 
4 
the experience of relations in the knowing relationship 
(which means that truth is a product of contextual 
verification), and his metaphysical position of Radical 
Empiricism with its view of a self-reparative world of 
becoming. James and these French philosophers each 
articulated a change in mentality seen in the 19th Century 
that sought to understand the world from the human 
perspective. 
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This thesis will examine the thought of the American 
philosopher, William James (1842-1910), and its inter-
relationship with the French philosophers, Charles 
Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile 
Boutroux. As intellectual history, my approach is 
patterned after the method of Albert Levi, Michel Foucault 
and Edward Said. Their works demonstrate that what is said 
to be objective knowledge is not impervious to external 
influences. Their method can be illustrated by drawing 
from the work of each of these scholars. 
Levi posits that we can view philosophy without 
1 
"pleading a special metaphysical case." Levi 
characterizes his book, Philosophy and the Modern World, as 
a "species of intellectual history." Rather than pursue 
philosophical criticism to ascertain an independent "truth" 
of ideas, Levi sets the development of philosophical 
systems in their relation to the dynamic movement of the 
particular societies with their contemporary developments. 
In his overview of the history of philosophical systems, 
Levi posits that man's formulation of conceptions about 
himself and life emerge in response to past conceptions, 
2 
and the developments of his own age. These conceptions are 
developed as programs for inquiry. 
Levi holds the thesis that philosophies can be seen 
as "varieties of contemporary intellectual experience." 
They paint a cultural portrait of an age precisely because 
they are a product of the social context that includes the 
philosopher. There is an "observable correlation between 
the form of any society" and the ideas that inform personal 
2 
conceptions. 
Levi explains his approach by reference to past 
philosophical systems. As an example, he points to the 
intellectual unity of the medieval synthesis as based upon 
the unity of social structure. The limited number of 
authoritative texts allowed an intellectual integration 
that the "modern consciousness" has not been able to 
achieve in large measure due to the multiplicity of views 
available to the modern reader. Our modern world is an 
"open" society in that there is no "consensus of belief 
guaranteed by a single authoritative intellectual elite;" 
consequently, "corresponding to the new social pluralism 
3 
there develops an intellectual pluralism." 
An example of the contextual nature of philosophical 
systems is found in reading Descartes' Meditations. Levi 
points out that we must consider that a man as old as 
Descartes, with his education and experience could not, in 
3 
actual fact, strip his mind of everything except doubt. 
Descartes employed this procedure as a technical device to 
invite the reader into an "as if" situation in order to 
4 
argue his case. Further, Levi points out that by looking 
at the development of science by Descartes' time, we 
recognize that the development of the mathematical sciences 
motivated Descartes to construct a philosophy of nature and 
a "picture of the human person" upon the very mathematical 
5 
foundations of his historical context. 
Michel Foucault investigated the relationship between 
power and knowledge. Foucault demonstrated how systems of 
authority emerge from the confluence of disparate 
circumstances. A cogent example is developed in 
Madness and Civilization. Foucault analyzes the effect of 
historical context in shaping the system for handling those 
labelled as insane. We find that the empty poor houses, 
the fear of the irrational, the organization of modern 
society, and the professionalization of the bourgeoisie, 
all played roles in the development of insane asylums to 
6 
quarantine the perceived "misfits" of society. The 
physician was placed in charge primarily due to his 
respectability, and eventually methods were used on the 
patients to adjust their thinking to be in line with middle 
class conceptions of proper conduct and productive work 
assumed to apply to everyone. There was no advance plan to 
-------i 
4 
orchestrate this outcome; rather, there were only multiple 
circumstances and problems to be resolved that came 
together in the formulation of a particular mentality. 
Edward Said, in Orientalism, explained the principles 
of his methodology which are in contradistinction to the 
non-political nature assumed to exist in the humanities and 
history. For Said, there is no such thing as a "pure, or 
7 
unconditional" idea. Particular areas of study do not 
exist only in texts, they are part of a larger whole. Said 
points out that conceptions about the Orient play a 
cultural role that connects "ideology, politics and the 
logic of power." Said states that his work is an 
investigation of authority: 
There is nothing mysterious or natural about 
authority. It is formed, irradiated, disseminated; 
it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has 
status, it establishes canons of taste and value; 
it is virtually indistinguishable from certain 
ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, 
perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, 
reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must, 
be analyzed.8 
For Said, scholarship is "willed human work" 
accomplished within a complex historical setting. Said 
addresses the question of how we can treat the cultural, 
historical phenomenon without losing sight of the relation 
between politics and culture. There is no fixed rule: 
My argument is that each humanistic investigation 
must formulate the nature of that connection in the 
specific context of the study, the subject matter, 
and its historical circumstances.9 
5 
One can make a powerful argument for Said's belief 
that all texts are "worldly and circumstantial and vary 
between genres and historical periods." Additionally, 
individual writers make an imprint on any "discursive 
formations." I have applied Said's conception of the 
personal dimension under consideration in this thesis: 
The starting-point of critical elaboration is the 
consciousness of what one really is, and is 
'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical 
process to date, which has deposited in you an 
infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. 
Therefore, it is imperative at the outset to 
compile such an inventory.10 
The essence of the scholarly approaches of Levi, Foucault 
and Said is that there is no such thing as a contextually 
neutral idea. I have applied this contextual method in my 
study of the philosophy of William James. 
This thesis will argue two issues: Wi 11 iam James' 
philosophy was to a great extent derived from his 
interaction with the French philosophers, Charles 
Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile 
Boutroux. Correlative to the fact that these five figures 
have an intellectual relationship with one another, I will 
argue that to understand James he must be placed within 
the context of these relations. These five philosophers, 
as a group, can be clearly seen and understood in the 
context of an identifiable movement. Each one was a part 
of a whole reality with their own slightly different 
6 
perspectives. However, the context that I will describe 
reveals the motivating factors of this movement towards a 
philosophy of action. This is not to say that there was 
one defined philosophy of action. Each contributed to the 
conception of a philosophy of action by their response to 
the same dilemmas of their time. They each address part of 
the total project. 
Although the historical context in France and the 
United States differed, James could identify with these 
French philosophers because there 
commonality in their situations. 
was an underlying 
In the United States, 
post-Civil War concern to develop science was manifested in 
a movement within the universities designed to establish a 
respectable intellectual place in the international 
context. This endeavor led to an academic politics 
centered around the issue of identifying what science was. 
In the 19th Century, the word "science" was subject 
to diverse usage, either science as knowledge in general or 
science as a reference to a branch of knowledge with 
specific procedures. Debates ensued to decide the exact 
nature of scientific method, to define what conception of 
science should prevail, and to determine what objects of 
knowledge would be susceptible to scientific authority. 
The successes of physics convinced many that without the 
7 
scientific stamp of authenticity, a subject could be 
dismissed derogatorily as "subjective opinion." 
Advances in science and technology challenged 
prevailing philosophies. Since the scientific revolution, 
various systems were devised to provide a rational 
explanation of the world. For some, rational thought found 
its epitomy in mathematical, or formally logical 
expression. Although an abstraction of only a part of 
human experience, rationalists felt that confidence in 
logical certitude was more valuable then the chaos of 
irrational aspects of human experience. 
Logical procedures, then, were to be in force in the 
pursuit of knowledge. Objective analysis expressed in 
logical/mathematical terms would insure the objective value 
of physics and were thought to be applicable in all 
branches of knowledge that claimed the name of "science." 
The human sciences tried to develop according to the model 
of physics. Laboratory experimentation in physiology, 
biology and psychology was designed to produce objective 
"data" that placed man's physical and affective life within 
an explanatory system in mechanistic terms. Practitions of 
this method were called empiricists, which, says James, is 
11 
"your lover of facts in all their crude variety." 
Since the Age of Reason, the belief in God's laws was 
steadily loosing ground to the logos of natural laws. 
8 
Information supplied by the scientific method left aside 
man's spiritual life. Religious authority could not easily 
communicate the miraculous to those schooled in terms of 
objectivity. If all knowledge was to be objective, then to 
both rationalist and empiricist, the question of God's 
relation to man was generalized and abstracted to the point 
of near meaninglessness in terms such as the "Unknowable." 
Those who objected to a view of objectivity defined 
exclusively by external natural phenomena were labelled 
"anti-intellectualists," meaning that their vision of the 
world did not correctly limit itself to that which was 
confined to rigidly logical terms. Nor did the so-called 
"anti-intellectualists" believe that external natural 
phenomena were satisfactorily explained by the rationalist 
conception of it. They were called subjectivists because 
they claimed that man was the author of his vision of truth 
even though he called it "objective." 
Bergson, Blonde! and Boutroux were 
subjectivism. 
James, Renouvier, 
each charged with 
To understand these labels, a few definitions need to 
be put forth as guides in pursuing the philosophic views of 
these five philosophers. They opposed absolutism, 
materialism, rationalism and scientism. By "absolutism" 
they meant the view that there was only one way of looking 
at things. For absolutists, truth was fixed according to 
9 
necessary, invariable rules. By "materialism" they had in 
mind the view that these "fixed and invariable" truths were 
mechanistic; truth was the unfolding of mechanical laws in 
physical nature. "Rationalism" referred to the view that 
sensation, or physical experience, was inferior to the 







"Scientism" basically meant 
that all supra-physical 
were unverifiable and, 
consequently, were outside of the knowing relationship. 
Religious and metaphysical questions about man's relations 
beyond the physical were meaningless in the view of 
scientism. 
James held that "No one can live an hour without both 
facts and principles, so it is a difference rather of 
emphasis," rationalist or empiricist, the contrast was 
"simple and massive." Recognizing that philosophies 
changed according to historical circumstances, James and 
these French philosophers sought to develop a vision of the 
world that was harmonious with their cultural experience. 
Nineteenth century positivism applied one method to 
all fields of inquiry, which imposed an either/or choice 
between facts and principles, between science and religion. 
For James and these French philosophers, the issue could be 
avoided i•f the question was posed in terms of the relation 
between method and object. James derived his pragmatic 
10 
method and his metaphysics, that he called Radical 
Empiricism, from French philosophy and its synthesis of 
Kant and Comte. In particular, we will see that 
Renouvier's idealistic, empiristic, phenomenological 
conception of free will were the essential seeds of James' 
philosophy which offered the alternative view of an open 
attitude: 
By 
Ought not the existence of the various types of 
thinking which we have reviewed, each so splendid 
for certain purposes, yet all conflicting still, 
and neither one of them able to support a claim of 
absolute veracity, to awaken a presumption 
favorable to the pragmatistic view that all our 
theories are instrumental, are mental modes of 
adaptation to reality. Certainly the restlessness 
of the actual theoretic situation, the value for 
some purposes of each thought-level, and the 
inability of either to expel the others decisively, 
suggest this pragmatistic view.12 
"modes of adaption," James meant to reject the 
intellectual battles within the universities and stress the 
fact that there was a level where both science and religion 
were manifestations of action. 
The same situation occurred in France on a larger 
scale. Republican politics had embraced the exclusive 
reliance on objectivity characteristic of positivism as its 
ideological base, thereby, drawing philosophy into 
political battles. Focusing on politics and culture, I 
propose to begin with the historical context in the United 
States and France. I have consciously included a 
disproportionate amount of French history because the 
11 
political battles there were as large as life itself. The 
French situation was not only complex by its diversity but 
it magnified the important issues that directly effected 
these philosophers and must be understood if we are to 
understand James' philosophy and his participation in the 
movement for a philosophy of action. For James, Renouvier, 
Bergson, Blondel and Boutroux, the divisions in their 
culture manifested a pluralism in politics and thought. 
They each sought an acceptable philosophical position that 
allowed intellectual freedom in the face of such pluralism. 
Notes 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
THE UNITED STATES 
In the first half of the 19th Century, the United 
States experienced a profound growth of industrialization. 
Industrialization was 
States. In contrast, 
most pronounced in the 
the economic base of the 
Northern 
Southern 
states remained essentially agricultural. 
culture was dependent on black slave 
Their agrarian 
labor in the 
production of crops, such as cotton and tobacco, at a cost 
that could compete in foreign markets. The supply of 
cotton for England's industrial mills was critical to the 
Southern economy. 
Thoughout the 1850's dissension between the Northern 
and Southern States increased to critical proportions. The 
discord revolved around two main issues: 1) The abolition 
of slavery and the guarantee of individual rights, and 2) 
the Federal governments authority to enact laws applicable 
to all of the States. The Presidential election of the 
Republican, Abraham Lincoln, in 1860, was followed by the 
Southern succession from the Union and the formation of a 
Southern Confederacy. As a result, Civil War ensued from 
14 
1861-1865, which ended in victory for the North and the 
federal union of all of the States. 
The post-Civil War reconstruction included the 
national political need to provide a common focus for 
America in order to raise political consciousness above the 
level of regional divisions. Along with the domestic 
political and economic needs of the United States, there 
was the desire to overcome the "colonial mentality" 
attributed to the United States, and establish the United 
States as an intellectual and political power of importance 
1 
within the larger international context. The development 
of science, as a means to promote American interests was an 
important part of the overall political agenda. 
To involve America in scientific questions, Congress 
authorized four surveys of the American West. Federally 
financed research promoted a competition for the funding of 
2 
scientific research. Harvard, Princeton and other 
institutions of higher education were involved in a process 
of organizing education in accordance with the national 
demands for the wedding of science, 
3 
professionalism. There were political 
technology and 
ramifications 
within institutions of higher education as each strove to 
establish themselves as preeminent academic institutions 
within the international community. 
15 
The second half of the 19th Century saw the 
organization of graduate schools and a competition to 
4 
attract and produce internationally recognized scholars. 
As an example Louis Agassiz, a renowned Swiss scientist, 
won Americans' hearts because he choose to remain at 
Harvard in order to study natural phenomena in America. He 
organized the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard to 
"be one of the great scientific institutions of the world." 
Agassiz' project of writing a natural history using 
American specimens brought donations of both funding and 
5 
specimens from the American public. 
The scientific needs of the United States legitimized 
the placement of scientific investigations as a primary 
goal. The problems for the pursuit of overall knowledge 
was the incomplete understanding of the nature of 
scientific investigation. Its scope and limitations 
concerned intellectuals like James who believed in the 
efficacy of the scientific method but found its intrusion 
into the humanities caused a myopic vision that threatened 
6 
the exercise of intellectual freedom. 
The debates over Darwin exemplify the problems that 
occurred when facts about the physical nature of the world 
and man obtained by scientific observation were employed in 
theoretical explanations of the affective, spiritual and 
moral life of man. The prestige of men of science had grown 
16 
to such an extent that they were publicly speculating on 
areas of life outside their expertise. They generalized 
information that obtained in mechanistic operations and 
applied it to ultimate questions. The generalization of 
mechanistic operations in addressing ultimate questions 
obscured the hypothetical nature of inquiry and encouraged 
assertions about personal concerns that minimized the 
7 
importance of the individual. 
In the academic world, Darwinism's impact was 
immense. Debates about conclusions and interpretations of 
Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) work varied and of ten 
reflected the application of arbitrarily selected portions 
of Darwin's thought applied to contemporary concerns rather 
than a fidelity to Darwin. Thus, references to Darwin 
should be read as references to the variety of forms found 
under the general heading of Darwinism. Darwin's theory of 
natural selection was not, at first, as much of a problem 
as was establishing the fact of evolution at all. 
At first, Darwinism had to compete with Neo-
Lamarckianism, which was an alternative explanation of 
evolution. At the turn-of-the-century, there were more 
Neo-Lamarckians than Darwinists in the United States. Neo-
Lamarckian evolutionary thought stressed a process of 
growth and decline, of "discernible patterns of youth, 
maturity and senescence"; when vitality was depleted, 
17 
8 
extinction occurred. Neo-Lamarckian transformism 
accommodated acknowledgment of an original force that set 
the world and life going and supplied it with the mechanism 
that kept it going. Science and some conception of a 
creator could co-exist and even relate as parts of a whole. 
In 1868, James Mccosh, the new President of Princeton, 
"openly avowed his belief that evolution and Christianity 
9 
could coexist." 
A close relationship existed between science and 
10 
religion in the United States. Considering the 
relatively sceptical reception of Darwin's earlier works, 
religious leaders thought that scientists would respond 
negatively to Darwin's Origin of Species (1859). However, 
Origin of Species was taken seriously. As early as 1866, 
Jeffries Wyman had supported Darwin when Wyman showed that 
there was an "irregularity in bee cell construction that 
was visible to the naked eye--so instinct was 
11 
not 
invariable." The challenge for Darwinism was the issue 
of genetics. Random selection in a process of continuous 
growth contradicted the pattern of growth and decline by 
which Neo-Lamarckianism explained evolution. Finally, the 
recognition of Mendelian genetics meant Neo-Lamarckianism's 
12 
decline and an increased preference for Darwinism. 
Scientists and theologians came to accept the co-
existence of some causal form and evolution, yet the theory 
18 
of natural selection, with chance as the formative 
principle of species, was a matter for continued debate. 
Interpretations of the theory of natural selection were put 
forth that explained original design in terms of the laws 
13 
of nature. 
In an age of physics, primary qualities and evidence 
of materiality were most important. With Darwin and Wundt, 
"It is the sciences of life and of consciousness which 
occupy men's minds and in which they might rightfully seek 
14 
the clue to an adequate metaphysics." To pattern the non-
physical on a physical model accentuated the differences of 
the objects by the limited explanation afforded by physical 
terms. The problem for the individual was that the life 
they lived and experienced did not run like a machine. 
Moral philosophy was required as individual decisions had 
to be made on every conceivable issue as a member of a 
democratic society. It was left to individual citizens to 
decide what was equally good or bad for both society and 
themselves. 
Darwin's particular blend of science and speculative 
theory created an acute challenge to the already precarious 
footing of religious experience. Darwin's theory of 
natural selection seemed to many to be so mechanistic as to 
relegate spiritual experience as unimportant and 
ineffective. In a sweep the idea of an absolute external 
19 
authority was replaced by law built into man's own person. 
As Levi put it: 
The body with its quaint apparatus of perception 
and motor habit becomes now not a cradle of man's 
reason, nor the fretful bearer of his immortality, 
but simply an instrument of action, and of action 
only.15 
Although emotional experiences were a part of man's 
life, they were the least possible to understand because 
they functioned outside the law as irrational experiences. 
As Levi put it, Darwinism carried two themes seemingly at 
odds: 1) Man's life depended on mechanism, susceptible of 
analysis. 2) Man's physical continuity with the animal 
world was reflected in his irrationality. The central 
place of irrationality brought into question the "insights 
of a philosophical tradition which dominated Western 
16 
thought for 2,000 years." 
Evolution prevailed as far as its acceptance meant 
the recognition that man evolved from the lower animals, 
and that man could look at himself from an earthly 
perspective, rather than from a conception of God as an 
external creator. Man could look at himself as a source of 
knowledge and work his way outward. Darwinism potentially 
reversed the traditional point of view. If carried to a 
theoretical level, evolutionary conceptions confined to 
mechanism, meant man was not free at all; man had no "free-
will" or power to direct his life. Without the ability to 
20 
wield a power effective over human life, man would be 
unable to govern himself. Accepting a positive method to 
ensure that what was known was true, even if it was 
necessary to limit what could be known, was one reaction to 
the dilemma. As such, positivism was fine as far as it 
went. The problem was that it did not go far enough. 
William James' philosophy was intimately involved 
with the questions Darwinism raised. Although James was a 
proponent of Darwin and science, he objected to authorities 
who rigidly promoted their interpretations of these 
viewpoints in every field. In his 1879 essay on "The 
Sentiment of Rationality," James took the position that his 
entire philosophical effort maintained: 
Materialism will always fail of universal adoption. 
For materialism denies reality to the objects of 
almost all the impulses which we most cherish. Any 
philosophy which annihilates the validity of the 
reference by explaining away its objects or 
translating them into terms of no emotional 
pertinency, leaves the mind with little to care or 
act for. In short, we go in against materialism 
very much as we should go in, had we a chance, 
against the second French empire ... or any other 
system of things toward which our repugnance is 
vast enough to determine energetic action, but too 
vague to issue in distinct argumentation.17 
Although opposed to materialism, James did not 
abandon practical reality for abstract religious doctrines. 
He specifically singled out the negative influence of rigid 
religious dogmas setting the questions for knowledge in 
18 
general. For James, there was a difference between 
21 
religious institutions and religious experience. James 
proposed to begin with the individual religious experience 
in order to ascertain what parts of man's personal 
19 
experiences were shared in common with humanity. His 
concern with religion, science and philosophy was to 
approach each subject in terms of the object appropriate to 
it. The rejection of the spiritual for the physical, or 
the physical for the spiritual was unacceptable. 
Scientific investigation required clarification but its 
application to religious, or metaphysical questions 
prompted James to concentrate on the latter to ascertain 
the relation between science and religion. He pursued an 
integral approach to knowledge in that his object was the 
whole of human experience. Oliver Wendell Holmes, a life-
long friend of James', said after reading Pragmatism: "I 
now see, as I have seen in his other books that I have 
read, that the aim and end of the whole business is 
20 
religious." 
In an 1876 article in The Nation James called 
attention to the problems that were to preoccupy his 
generation: 1) The form of philosophic problems and 
discussions should not be set by the Church. 2) All 
questions should proceed as if there was no official answer 
"preoccupying the field." 3) Philosophy "means the habit 
of always seeing an alternative ... of making 
22 
conventionalities fluid again ... it means the possession of 
mental perspective." 4) Scientific advances required "a 
change in the method and personnel of philosophic study." 
The philosopher had to be able to understand and account 
for a vast amount of new facts with 
21 
implications, such as Darwinism. 
metaphysical 
James had begun his academic career just before 
institutional politics in higher education began to 
intensify. His professional career was marked by the 
political tensions within Harvard and between Harvard and 
other institutions. The desire to become a world-class 
institution and attract and produce renowned scholars had 
deleterious consequences for those who did not fit in, such 
as Charles S. Pierce. James' friendship with Pierce began 
in his college years when they were fellow members of the 
small group of men that formed "The Metaphysical Club" in 
22 
the early 1870's. James and his father worked on behalf 
of obtaining an appointment for Pierce in a university. 
However, Pierce's ill-humour and independence of thought 
23 
worked against a permanent appointment. It was from 
Pierce that James had borrowed the term pragmatism. 
However, regardless of Pierce's genius, James' efforts to 
get Charles Eliot, the President of Harvard, to give Pierce 
24 
an appointment were regularly refused. 
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The changes in higher: education from the 1890's 
onwards, brought responses from James. In 1892 James' 
essay "A Plea for Psychology as a Natural Science" 
expressed his dismay over the conditions of psychology, 
which were "as a mass of phenomenal description, gossip and 
25 
myth." For James, psychology should renounce ultimate 
questions and be organized as a natural science. As such, 
psychology would leave the ultimate questions to philosophy 
and develop according to its object. Psychology was to 
seek practical rules for educators, doctors, clergyman and 
"asylum-superintendents." Separating psychology from 
philosophy would allow men of facts and laboratories to 
pursue their questions 
26 
metaphysical questions. 
without the intrusion of 
The direction of higher education was again addressed 
by James in his 1903 essay "The Ph.D. Octopus." James 
lamented the emphasis on higher diplomas over individual 
27 
"brilliancy and originality." The creation of an 
atmosphere of supply and demand based on credentials was a 
part of the general movement for "distinction" in acquiring 
a reputation. For: James, it was a "grotesque tendency" and 
a "Mandarin disease." The institutionalization of need and 
motive tended to the development of a "tyrannical Machine." 
Its fostering transferred the value of talent to an 
28 
"outward badge." By so doing, university faculties were 








The trend for 
America would 
of individual 
spontaneity that plagued European countries, in James' 
opinion, who by their State examinations and control were a 
tyranny over intellectual pursuit. For James, the social 
and political implications were a threat to American 
freedom. 
Another indication of the problem of university 
prestige can be seen in James' efforts to resign from 
Harvard. Heart disease was an increasing problem for 
James. His heart problems motivated a concern to avoid the 
stresses of course lectures, students and public lectures. 
In 1900 James offered his resignation to the Harvard 
Trustees. President Eliot convinced him to postpone it. 
Repeated attempts to resign were also rejected. In 1904, 
James again sought to resign and accept a one year 
appointment at Leland Stanford University. Eliot responded 
by offering temporary breaks, "but nothing which can in the 
public e~e detach you from the University." Eliot stressed 
that it would be disadvantageous to Harvard to have James 
connected with another institution. Eliot appealed to 
James on the grounds that his continuous connection with 
the university was an advantage that James owed to Harvard. 
25 
It was not until 1907 that James' resignation was finally 
29 
accepted. 
The problems of education, science, religion and 
philosophy were all problems that concerned James and the 
four French philosophers of action next to be considered. 
In order to understand these philosophers of action, one 
must have a clear picture of the historical context which 
prompted the development of their philosophies. In turn, 
some similarity between conditions in the United States and 
France account for the sympathy and mutual understanding 
between James and these French philosophers of action. 
France 
In France, national political conflicts affected 
religious and educational institutions as both were by law 
State institutions controlled by government officials. The 
Catholic Church had provided the ideological basis for 
monarchical government with its belief in the divine rights 
of kings and was entrenched in social institutions. 
Although the 1789 revolution brought an end to absolute 
monarchy, Napoleon's reign reestablished a traditional 
authoritarian mentality by the institution of centrally 
controlled State power. 
The University of France, established in 1806, gave 
the State a monopoly over public education. However, from 
the 1815 restoration onwards the State control of education 
26 
meant that schools, faculties and curriculum were subject 
to the political changes that occurred throughout the 19th 
Century. For example, the failure of the 1848 revolutions 
triggered a conservative reaction in government and, 
consequently, in education. 
To curb republican sentiment, the State promoted 
Catholic interests. Soltau designated the period from 1849 
to about 1859 as "the Clerico-Bonaparte" alliance, which 
included: 1) State guarantee of the Church's legal rights 
and Catholicism as "the religion of the State," 2) the 
authority of religious orders, 3) censorship of the Press 
to outlaw criticism of dogma and authority, and 4) a 
disproportionate influence by Bishops over State agencies 
regulating University and secondary education. Soltau 
cited: 
In the first four year of Imperial rule the number 
of State secondary establishments had diminished by 
48, that of scholars by 2000, whereas, that of 
"free" (i.e. Church) schools had risen by 167 and 
of their scholars by over 10,000."30 
Throughout the 1860s protests against the neglect of 
science and technology increased and culminated in the 
republican cry, which "hailed the debacle of the 
"metaphysical" Second Empire and the emergence of the 
31 
"positivist" Third Republic." The post-war Republican 
government unleashed the unresolved questions of the French 
.revolutions. During the Second Empire, the Liberal Party 
-i 
27 
had been preoccupied with opposing excess rather than with 
mastering the 
32 
intricacies of a democratic form of 
government. Intellectual and religious freedom remained 
undefined. The shout of a triumphant "positivist" Third 
Republic in 1870 was premature in the face of a monarchist 
political majority. To understand the political 
instability of the Third French Republic, an overview of 
the interplay between republicans and the monarchists in 
the national legislative bodies. 
The Third French Republic 
The Second French Empire entered the Franco-Prussian 
War (1870) as the strongest military power on the 
Continent. French pride and confidence in their military 
capabilities was soon dispelled by the alarming rate of 
Prussian military successes during the war. The spector of 
military defeat caused political repercussions in France 
that culminated in the demise of the Second Empire and the 
establishment of a Government for National Defense choosen 
33 
by elections to a National Assembly. A Republ le was 
thereby tentatively put into place. Between 1871 and 1879, 
the outcome of the political contest between monarchists 
and republicans was the establishment of the Third French 
Republic (1870-1915). However, for the rest of the century 
the ramifications of the disparate political conceptions 
28 
held by monarchists and republicans exacerbated the 
difficulties of republican reconstruction. 
During the administration of Aldoph Thiers, from 
February 1871 to May 1873, the majority of the National 
Assembly were monarchists who agreed to a Republic and to 
the National Assembly only as a temporary measure. Desire 
to both end the war and to place the blame for the war on 
the republicans were the main reasons for the monarchists' 
34 
support of the Republic. The monarchists needed time to 
resolve the problem of authority within their own ranks, 
which entailed the fusion of the two branches of the House 
~ 




a restoration of a 
Toward this end, 
monarchist political 
the monarchist majority 
succeeded in gaining the readmittance of the princes of the 
I 
Orleanist branch to France and in getting their privileges 
36 
restored. 
Within the ranks of royalists there was fierce 
disagreement over the choice between a restoration of an 
absolute monarchy or the establishment of a constitutional 
monarchy. The members of the younger, Constitutionalist 
Orlean's line, led by the comte de Paris, recognized that 
once a form of representative government had been 
institutionalized, the extent of freedom and authority 
would be perpetually debated. With a strong leader, 
29 
constitutional monarchists hoped to minimize individual 
freedom by maximizing State authority. 
To overcome the divisions between the two branches, 
the Constitutionalists agreed to accept the leadership of 
the representative of the Legitimist branch, the comte de 
37 
Chambord. The comte de Chambord ref used to lead the 
reconciliation of the two monarchist groups under the 
Tricolors of the revolutionary flag, which the 
Constitutionalists required. His archaic ideas were left 
untouched by his 40 years away from France. Chambord was an 
extreme absolutist unable to conceive of the legitimacy of 
any representative government. He remained a believer in 
the divine right of kings and could not forgive the younger 
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branch for forsaking Louis XVI. While the monarchists' 
schism made it impossible for them to consolidate their 
power, bye-elections were increasing republican membership 
39 
in the Assembly. 
The events of the Mac-Mahon administration, from May, 
1873 to January, 1879, show the uncertainties of outcome 
when questions are decided by representative debate, and 
his administration shows the precariousness of political 
alliances. Mac-Mahon's L'ordre moral implied resistence to 
radicalism (republicanism) and a conservative policy 
strongly in favor of the Church, yet Mac-Mahon had to work 
within the Republican system. Although Mac-Mahon was anti-
30 
republican, the political climate worked against him and 
his term of off ice saw the reestablishment of a Republic 
40 
coupled with a sort of religious revival. 
The conservatives had supported Mac-Mahon in 
opposition to candidates who supported further republican 
reforms. However, the internal dissension of the 
conservatives prevented them from developing a unified 
political program consonant with the requirements encumbent 
upon Mac-Mahon working within a Republican system. As a 
result, Mac-Mahon had to rely on coalition ministries 
difficult to reconcile. Needing time to resolve their 
difficulties, monarchists moved in opposition to the 
republicans by carrying a vote giving executive power to 
Mac-Mahon for a definite period of seven years. By this 
maneuver, a conservative head of the nation, Mac-Mahon, was 
provided who it was hoped might outlast the Assembly and 
41 
act to restore monarchist principles. 
Both extreme royalists and extreme radicals 
frightened the broad center, which proceeded to chose a 
conservative republic over either extreme. In January, 
1875, an amendment passing by one vote, provided that a 
President of the Republic be elected by an absolute 
majority of votes by the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies, united as a National Assembly. The President 
would be elected for a seven year term and eligible for 
31 
reelection. This insured that a President would be elected 
after Mac-Mahon and the transmission of power would occur 
42 
in a republic. 
Thus, the conservative monarchist majority, unable to 
develop a satisfactory program of their own, was 
instrumental in establishing the Third French Republic. The 
political course of events between 1871 and 1879 resulted 
in the establishment of a president over any French 
government, the enactment of a constitution, parliament and 
republic over France, and the election of a republican 
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majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. 
However, the political power of the monarchists remained 
strong and was used to challenge republican reforms 
whenever possible. The degree of political instability in 
both the conservative and republican camps of the Third 
French Republic was reflected in the cabinet dissolutions. 
In the 41 years of the Third French Republic, 49 cabinets 
44 
were instituted. 
The political tensions that plagued the Third French 
Republic were dramatized in the case of Alfred Dreyfus. 
From 1894 to 1906 the sides were drawn between republican 
and monarchists, and within these two groups, by one's 
45 
position regarding Alfred Dreyfus. Dreyfus, a Jewish 
military officer, was wrongly accused and sentenced for 
treason. For authoritarians, the issue was the public 
32 
admittance that the highest army officials could have made 
a mistake in accusing Dreyfus. The conservative 
monarchist's and clergy's platform of traditional law and 
order endorsed the military as a major force for stability; 
as such, they considered that the military should not be 
challenged on peripheral issues. Traditionalists, both 
republicans on the extreme right and monarchists, advised 
sacrificing Dreyfus for the higher duty of honoring 
authority; individual free rights were to be subordinated 
to order. The twelve years of turmoil over Dreyfus can be 
seen as a symptom of the difficulty for absolutist 
convictions to accommodate freedom in politics, religion or 
education. 
Both conservatives and republicans realized that the 
knowledge transmitted in the educational system could have 
a strong influence on society in its endorsement of 
republican or monarchist principles. Conservatives when in 
political power were in a position to effect social change. 
Working together, the conservatives made provisions for the 
expansion of the "free" universities, not under the control 
of the potentially radical State. In the name of 
46 
intellectual freedom, Catholic faculties expanded. The 
instablity of the socio-political situation placed Church, 
State and education in a state of tension. Expansion of 
Catholic educational facilities followed by contraction 
33 
and/or persecution paralleled shifts in sentiment toward 
conservatism and Catholicism. On the other hand, 
republicans adopted "positive science" as their ideological 
base and promoted its predominance in the educational 
system. The consequences of the republican adoption of 
positivism as their ideological base, can be best 
understood by looking at the development of Auguste Comte's 
thought and the effect of its application in religious and 
educational affairs. 
Positivism and The Third French Republic 
Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) positive philosophy 
developed from 1830 onwards. Comte's historical vision of 
the world in his law of three stages, showed man to have 
passed through a theological stage, followed by a 
metaphysical stage that was at the time passing into a 
positive stage of knowledge whereby the first two stages 
were superceded by the realization that only positive facts 
and observable phenomena and the objective relations of 
these and the laws that determine them were legitimate 
objects of knowledge. As for religion, abandoning all 
inquiry into causes or ultimate origins meant that the 
object of worship would no longer be God, a supernatural 
external authority; instead of God, the object of worship 
would be the observable projection of human life in the 
47 
collective form of Humanity. 
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In Politigue positive, Book IV, Comte stated his 
mission: 
No more empiricism, no more a priori reasoning. In 
political philosophy there can be no order or 
agreement save by fastening social phenomena, just 
as all other phenomena, down to unchanging natural 
laws, the sum-total of which traces for every 
epoch, free from any possible uncertainty, the 
essential limits and nature of political action.48 
John Stuart Mill defined the positivism of Comte as the 
"substitution of the scientific for the religious point of 
view, and the application of the philosophical method to 
social studies." 
Comte had designed his systematic organization to 
work as a whole. Positivists were to devote themselves 
religiously to Humanity by a "political and moral 
reconstruction of a society adrift since the French 
Revolution had brought the old order to its deserved 
49 
end." The "Positivist Society" in Paris was founded in 
1848 as a political discussion group with Comte as 
President, with Comte as the High Priest of the "Religion 
of Humanity" and a committee of three as the temporal 
power. Comte intended an administration of positivism in 
50 
France. Comte's early death left his disciples without an 
appointed successor as High Priest. The followers of Comte 
were not consistent in their adoption of positivism's 
tenents. Political programs by both monarchist and 
republican incorporated only those parts of Comte's thought 
35 
that were consistent with their programs. As the 
ideological base of the Third Republic, republicans 
stressed Comte's attack on metaphysical politics. 
Traditionalists promoted the Comtian argument against 
revolutionary ideology, excessive focus on individual 
rights, and especially, his view of the Church as the 
51 
foundation of social order against revolutionary ideals. 
Efforts for positive human sciences were continued by those 
52 
who interpreted Comte as stressing method. 
For Comtism, the real unit of society was the social 
group, which was defined as a collective embodiment of the 
past, present and future of Humanity. John Stuart Mill 
described Comtism as "the most complete system of spiritual 
and temporal despotism that ever issued from the brain of 
any human being, except perhaps Ignatius Loyola." 
Soltau maintained that Comte was a political 
conservative seeking to supply an authority for an 
aristocratic intelligentsia who would save society from 
anarchical conceptions of individual freedom. The idea of 
human right was to be replaced by the discernment of "the 
true meaning of social evolution" by those trained to 
examine the facts of tradition, formulate their laws and 
53 
govern society accordingly. 
A philosophy that placed the welfare of the 
collective above the individual and advocated a republic 
36 
with an elite that appealed to sociology was attractive to 
the republican bourgeousie who valued order (in their 
favor) as highly as monarchists. Soltau summarized 
Comtism's principles as, 1) the belief in a conscious 
organization of society along scientific lines, 2) the 
belief in the need for and the possibility of social 
reconstruction, 3) the recognition of economic factors and 
the attempt at scientific analysis of existing conditions. 
Although these convictions were not in themselves 
untenable, the problem with Comtism was that it was 
presented in "a messianic atmosphere that could only spell 
54 
ultimate collapse." 
Early in the Republic the endorsement of republican 
positivism showed its inadequacies in reconciling the 
strong partisan passions of the major social groups. 
Generally, republican positivism held that the Catholic 
Church was inconsistent with positive science and should be 
stripped of secular power. Republicans emphasized the 
pernicious historical ties between Catholicism and 
monarchy. They felt a Republic must educate citizens as 
republicans, and to put their faith in science rather than 
religious ideology. Toward this end, the superstitious 
influence of Catholicism was to be removed from educational 
institutions. The result was resurgent outbreaks of anti-
clericalism during the Third Republic. Purging the public 
37 
educational system of religious influence was a complex and 
massive task in light of the history of the Catholic Church 
in France. It was so entrenched in the educational system 
that efforts to separate Church and State magnified the 
issue between absolutism and freedom. 
In 1878 and 1880 scholars suspected of clerical 
sympathies were removed from prominent academic position. 
As an example, in 1880 the Catholic philosopher Leon Olle-
Laprune, one of the two major influences on Maurice 
Blondel, was removed from his academic post. An appeal on 
his behalf resulted in his reinstatement with the penalty 
55 
of the lose of one year's salary. The "scientific myth" 
of the Third Republic was that "science had replaced 
religion in explaining the world." Exact knowledge was 
called for by the right of citizens to be taught certain 
56 
facts deriving from the "pure experimental method." 
The conception of a "pure experimental method" that 
could be applied in all fields provoked responses from a 
number of influential scientists. Clarification of the 
relationship between theory and practice put forth by some 
scientists challenged the conceptions of "old positivism." 
For example, the conception that one method was applicable 
to all fields of inquiry was criticized by the French 
physicist Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). The nature of 
38 
objectivity in the mathematical formulas was expressed in 
the perspective of Duhem: 
Metaphysical and religious doctrines are judgments 
touching on objective reality, whereas the 
principles of physical theory are propositions 
relative to certain mathematical signs stripped of 
all objective existence. Since they do not have 
any common terms these two sorts of judgments can 
neither contradict nor agree with each other.57 
Duhem's assertions brought responses from republican 
officials throughout his professional career. The course 
of Duhem's career reveals the tyranny that could develop 
when the ideology of positivism was used to judge the 
competency of a scholar. It was generally agreed that 
Duhem's work in theoretical physics was brilliant and that 
he was a prime candidate for a major post in Paris, the 
center of the higher education system. Instead, Duhem was 
given an appointment at Bordeaux in 1895; i n 18 9 8 i t was 
noted that his "independence of character was a little 
excessive." In the middle of the great anti-clerical 
movement fueled by the controversial Dreyfus Affair, the 
official report on Duhem's performance stressed the fact 
that he was an "intransigent Catholic." 
The objections to Duhem over a thirty-year period, 
moved from noting his outspoken, obstinate attitude in 
theoretical debates with colleagues to branding his 
behavior with the epithet of "intransigent Catholic." 
The records show that 'the republican officials could not 
39 
easily overlook the fact that he was a Catholic. As Paul 
noted, Duhem's personality may have kept him from an 
appointment in Paris, yet the rectors' reports through the 
58 
years note his Catholicism as the troublesome point. By 
1910 the separation of Church and State had been enacted, 
which eased the pressure somewhat that had been brought to 
bear on scholars who happened also to be Catholics. Only 
then, after 30 years of service, Duhem was no longer seen 
as a threat. After his death, the street where he had 
lived in Bordeaux was renamed after him in recognition of 
his intellectual contributions. 
Concern about the relationship between science, 
religion, and philosophy can be seen in the efforts to 
formulate a reasonable explanation by those concerned to 
rescue a position for Catholic thought. The difficulties 
involved were evident in the construction of views that 
proposed different solutions to the question of the 
relationship of Christianity in society. Catholicism was 
the predominant form of Christian thought in France. 
Therefore, we can look at the thought of Catholic thinkers 
in order to clarify the issues as seen in the 19th Century. 
Catholicism In France 
It must be understood that the Catholic Church in 
France did not have a monolithic concept of its place in 
society. The socio-political situation caused the Church 
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leaders and concerned Catholics to review their relation to 
the State and their role in society, to determine what 
their primary duty was, i.e. spiritual and/or social. 
Within the Catholic Church itself, the same sides were 
drawn and the battle took place as it did in parliament and 
in academic circles. The ideas of the various Catholic 
factions can be seen in the activities of the Action 
Fran~aise, the Catholic Modernists and the Neo-Thomists as 
each faced the same configuration of questions encountered 
in the political and academic fields. 
As the ideological leader of the Action Francaise 
from 1899, Charles Maurras opposed romanticism and the 
ideas of 1789. Individualism, with its egocentric self, 
59 
was for Maurras, a social ill requiring exorcism. By 
synthesizing nationalism, positivism and Catholicism, 
Maurras wed traditional French politics and religion with 
a view of science that accommodated absolutism. 
Maurras' thought was structured on a brand of 
nationalism that called positivists and Catholics to join 
in support of their "common interest." As Sutton points 
out, Maurras had a problem common to many: He was brought 
up a Catholic; yet, in a world fascinated by science, he 
was unable to conceive of the world in "theological terms 
and was distressed at the resultant disorder affecting his 
60 
thought and action." 
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Maurras expressed appreciation for Comte's aphorism 
'submission is the basis of perfection.' According to 
Maurras, Comte affirmed the following: 1) A clear 
statement of the illogical nature of modern individualism. 
2) Men were bound together by race and the law of 
continuity, which required a State religion to insure 
continuity of traditional values and order. 
61 
Catholic Church was an agent of social order. 
3 ) The 
Maurras' nationalism resided in the continuous social 
fact of the nation as the important fact. As Maur:ras put 
it, "la patrie" was "the holiest of things," and it was the 
individual man's responsibility to see to it that the 
abstract collective of the French nation was paramount over 
the individual. Since he equated personal identity with 
one's "Frenchness," it followed that power would then 




These authorities would be an aristocratic elite, the 
intelligentia who research and profess within a traditional 
mentality. For Maurras, the anti-social nature of 
anarchism, liberalism and individualism all derived from 
the Protestant Reformation and the assertion of freedom of 
63 
conscience. Positivism as a description could be used, 
not as an explanation which required causal connections, 
but simply as :repeating what was seen, fixing the past as 
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much as possible into the potentially fluid aspects of 
experience. 
Maurras' Catholicism was said to be Catholicism 
without religion: 
The merit and the honour of Catholicism have been 
to structure the idea of God and to take away from 
it this poison {of Deism). On the road that leads 
to God, the Catholic finds legions of 
intermediaries: some are terrestrial and some 
supernatural, but the chain from one to another is 
a continuous one. Heaven and earth are thus amply 
peopled as once they were with gods. Catholicism 
proposes the only idea of God that is tolerable in 
a well organized State.64 
For Maurras, the form of religion without the content 
should be put to the socially useful task of keeping order 
within the masses whom he believed were incapable of 
governing themselves. Man's intelligence was to be used 
for enlightenment in service to one's country. Maurras 
made man, in the collective, the center and measure of all 
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things. It was one solution to the problem of the 
relationship between science and religion. 
The French Jesuit, Pedro Descogs published a series 
I 
of articles in the Jesuit review, Etudes, in which he found 
a "significant degree of compatibility between many of 
66 
Maurras' ideas and Catholic doctrine." The authoritative 
effect of Jesuit endorsement brought a reaction by Catholic 
Modernists who objected to Maurras' incorporation of 
Catholicism into an atheistic conception. 
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We can look at the positions of the Catholic Neo-
Thomists and the Catholic Modernists for alternative views 
on the relation between science and religion. Generally, 
the advocates of Nee-Thomism were monarchists 
(authoritarian) and those of Catholic Modernists were more 
republican in sentiment, reflecting the same divisions 
67 
within the Church as found in secular institutions. 
Efforts to harmonize Catholic teaching with 
contemporary thought were launched in the 1879 encyclical 
by Leo XIII Aeternae Patris, which did not impose Thomism 
but nevertheless described it "as the most suitable among 
the philosophies for a victorious defence of religion," and 
instructed that it should be revived. The 1893 encyclical 
by Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus, denied the possiblity 
of disagreement between theologians and scientists 
"provided each kept to the proper limits, and affirmed the 
68 
inerrancy of the Bible in all its parts." 
In response the Revue thomiste was founded in 1893, 
which tried to adapt scholasticism, the synthesis of 
Aristotelian reason and faith that Thomas Aquinas had 
achieved, to modern science. The 1884 formation of "The 
Societe de Saint Thomas d'Aguin," in Paris, was a response 
to the Aeternae Patris to study Christian philosophy. They 
attempted "to expose and refute modern errors from the 
double viewpoint of Christian philosophy and the natural 
44 
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and experimental sciences." The revival of Thomism 
placed Thomas Aquinas' thought in the position of having to 
account for an entirely different world from the one for 
which it had been produced. Metaphysics had come first in 
Aquinas' thought. Neo-Thomists hoped that a revival of 
Aquinas' synthesis of reason and faith would supply the 
fundamentals necessary for a Catholic science opposed to 
70 
the modern atheistic science. By using reason to attain 
to both natural and supernatural truth, Thomists claimed 
both to be objective realities. 
An example of the efforts of Nee-Thomism to reconcile 
itself with the challenges of chemistry's "composition of 
bodies" illustrates the problems. The Thomist Ramiere, in 
the 1870's, explained that "in the case of substantial 
change the body retains its primary matter but changes its 
old form for a new one." The substantial change in the 
Eucharist was thus in accord with natural science. Even 
with the soul as the vital force, Paul posits that "this 
kind of concordism made metaphysics dependent upon physical 
71 
theory." 
This kind of reciprocal support between science and 
religion seemed to some Catholic Modernists as obscuring 
the true nature of both science and religion. Maurice 
Blonde! (1861-1949) published responses to Maurras' 
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position and that of the Neo-Thomists as part of his 
concern for what he called in 1907: 
The present crisis, unprecedented perhaps in depth 
and extent--for it is at the same time scientific, 
metaphysical, moral, social and political--is not a 
"dissolution" (for the spirit of faith does not 
change), it is a purification of the religious 
sense, and an integration of Catholic truth.72 
Reardon maintained that Maurice Blondel's view on the 
relation between science and religion integrated 
Conventionalist ideas with Blondel's own philosophy of 
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action. Catholic and non-Catholic contributed to the new 
critique of science that was a part of an "integrated and 
interdisciplinary" philosophical movement, which began in 
74 
the 1870's. 
Conventionalism was the position developed by Henri 
I ~ 
Poincare (1854-1912). In turn, the center of Poincare's 
group was Emile Boutroux (1845-1921), a Sorbonne 
philosopher. The group also included Jules Tannery (1848-
1910), the director of the science curriculum at the Ecole 
normale superieure. The new critique (or Conventionalism) 
was a reaction against the old positivism, seen as too 
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deterministic. Turn-of-the-century conventionalist 
philosophy asserted that: 
Fundamental scientific 
reflections of the "real" 
but are convenient ways of 
world insofar as they are 
observation or experiment.76 
principles are not 
nature of the universe 
describing the natural 
not contradicted by 
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' Poincare's Conventionalism, which drew heavily from 
Emile Boutroux's philosophy of contingency and creativity, 
entailed, among other points, that: 1) There should be a 
rigorous interdisciplinary approach to knowledge instead of 
a rigid, authoritarian view that excluded the world of life 
as too unruly for the necessary degree of certitude, 
thereby reducing human experience to the level of the 
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simplest physical phenomena. Neither the mechanical 
determinism of Comte's disciples nor the historical 
determinism of German philosophy allowed "the world of 
science to coincide with the world of life." 2) For 
Boutroux, "each order of science implies postulates proper 
78 
to itself." 3) Against the old positivists, Boutroux 
argued that philosophy did not stop with the task of 
synthesizing the sciences; philosophy was a higher reason 
that united the natural world with "rational moral liberty 
79 
of action." 
. I b Po1ncare egan his intimate friendship and family 
relations with Boutroux, after Boutroux had outlined the 
above philosophical points in his 1874 thesis, The 
Contingency of the Laws of Nature. Although there are 
I 
points of difference between Poincare and Boutroux, 
I 
Poincare's Conventionalism also consisted of an opposition 
to the dogmatism of the positivist schools and Catholicism 
80 
because both "deprive us of impartiality of judgment." 
47 
Strictly mechanical formulations of science according to 
I 
Poincare, "fail to distinguish clearly between what is 
experiment, what is mathematical reasoning, what is 
convention, and what is hypothesis." Every law was only a 
provisional statement which would be replaced by a superior 
law, because the circumstances had been modified. 
Pointing out the role of social choices in determining our 
conceptions about knowledge, 
I 
Poincare held that 
"determinism presupposes liberty, since it is our free 
81 
choice that we have become determinists." 
As Boutroux's student, Blondel was schooled in 
Boutroux's view. Blonde! agreed with the premise of the 
new critique in that he saw science and religion as two 
separate discourses "based on their own special 
conventions, into which a certain element of arbitrariness 
always enters." Blondel's judgment on scholasticism was 
the same as 
82 
that of "the new criticism of 
positivism." Reardon concluded: 
They [scholasticism/Neo-Thomism and old positivism] 
both suffered from the intellectualist error of 
seeing truth as imposing itself on man's mind like 
an external decree, regardless of his ability to 
relate it to his own experience, and failing to 
recognize the dimensions of creativity and human 
thought.83 
old 
Whether the subject was science or religion, 
discourses were human productions with a subjective 
element. With Neo-Thomists and their scientific 
48 
apologetics there was a fruitless effort to harmonize "the 
conclusions of the positive sciences with the dogmas of the 
Church" that was based erroneously on the "assumption that 
science is seeking to give a picture of reality whereas in 
fact science is using symbols functionally for pragmatic 
84 
aims." 
On September 8, 1907, the encyclical Pascendi 
condemned the theses that some Catholic authorities found 
offensive in Catholic Modernism. Dansette summarized the 
offensive aspects: 
Agnosticism with regard to rational proofs; the 
doctrine of vital immanence, which derived 
religious truth from the individual need for faith 
and gave it no more than symbolic importance, 
attributing the origin of dogmas to the perception 
of God by the intelligence in man's innermost 
consciousness; attributing the origin of the 
sacraments to the need to give religion a tangible 
aspect and to make it known; and denying the place 
of the super-natural in history.85 
This condemnation came after over 17 years of 
polemics over the relation between the modern scientific 
86 
world and the traditions of Catholicism. Sutton 
concluded that the controversy centered on different ideas 
concerning "first, the relation between the natural and the 
supernatural (and therefore between politics and the realm 




The Task In Common 
The task in common for James, Renouvier, Bergson, 
Blonde! and Boutroux was the defense of intellectual 
freedom against dogmatism. A moral philosophy that 
justified freedom, intellectual and/or personal, was 
required in a democracy where the individual person 
participated in decisions that effected society. The 
political and theoretical needs of democracy, the challenge 
to the meaning of life and God, and the intrusion of a 
rigid conception 
resolved. The 
of science in philosophy needed to be 
combined effects of the political, 
religious, social and philosophical questions were the 
issues with which James, Renouvier, Boutroux, Bergson and 
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WILLIAM JAMES, CHARLES RENOUVIER AND HENRI BERGSON 
William James took part in the movement to meliorate 
the divisions in philosophy that occurred with the break up 
of classical philosophy and to define science, philosophy 
and religion by the object man intended each to apprehend. 
The break-up of classical philosophy took many directions. 
According to Eastwood, James' philosophy falls within the 
19th Century reversal of thought from the "outward, simple 
and universal" perspective of the Reign of Science (1850-
1890) to the personal, "inward, concrete and particular, 
which reproduced the synthetic centripetal tendency of 
1 
Pascal" seen in French thought. Both Pascal's Wager, the 
first "systematic attempt to apply the calculations of 
chance to a metaphysical question" (belief in God) and his 
aphorism, "the heart hath its reasons which reason knoweth 
2 
not," informed the work of these philosophers of action. 
Pascal's insistence on man's reliance on both the 
heart and mind in his consideration of the relations 
between faith and science, can be clearly identified in the 
work of James, Renouvier, Bergson, Blondel and Boutroux. 
In addition to the Pascalian elements, these philosophers 
can be classified as Nee-Kantian on the basis of their 
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central vision of human activity. Although each man's 
philosophy was unique, their response to the problems of 
abs ol ut ism, materialism, scientism and rationalism, 
justifies classifying them, as a group, as philosophers of 
action. The inclusion of William James in this group is 
based on James' adoption of Charles Renouvier's conception 
of free will, Henri Bergson's defense of the continuity of 
experience against the logic of identity and Maurice 
Blondel's technical presentation of his philosophy of 
action which was consonant with James' development of the 
metaphysical explanation of the nature of truth in terms of 
"becoming." James' relationship with Emile Boutroux was 
the summation of James' philosophy and Boutroux was the 
force that connected these five philosophers of action. 
The variants of "Kantisms" require that the origin of 
the term pragmatism as used by Kant be kept in mind to 
orient the connection between Kant's use and the scholars 
in question, who are called philosophers of action on the 
basis of the following precise connection: 
I call pragmatic the practical rule (law) derived 
from happiness as its moving principle (a rule of 
worldly wisdom) ... It is based on empirical 
principles because only from experience can I know 
what inclinations there are to be satisfied and 
which are the natural causes which might procure 
their satisfaction ... When I do not know with 
certainty the conditions under which an end may be 
achieved, I call the accidental belief, which is, 
however, the basis for using certain means, 
the aspect of what] as a free agent he can 
accomplish in the world.3 
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Kant's Critique of Pure Reason specifically designated a 
practical rule in response to the needs criticism 
unearthed. 
James' contemporary Pragmatism developed as a 
criticism of Nee-Hegelian Idealism; it was a "revaluation 
from within." Caponigri correctly stated the case by 
emphasizing that pragmatism sought an "intellectual 
reconstruction" to accommodate the new problems in 
4 
intellectual life brought by the newer sciences. The term 
was taken up by so many that Lovejoy was able to designate 
"Thirteen Pragmatisms" in a 1908 article in the Journal of 
Philosophy. Caponigri isolated "certain constants" 
characteristic of pragmatism. The variations have in 
common: 1) a metaphysical aspect, which was "an effort to 
construct a viable theory of truth and of reality;" and, 2) 
a methodological aspect, which was an "effort to formulate 
5 
a theory of meaning." 
Both absolute idealism and rigid positivism were 
rejected by these philosophers of action. Positivism was 
publicized as an empirical philosophy and a scientific 
displacement of metaphysics. Comte's disciples defined 
positivism in a variety of ways. The most popular versions 
left out his spiritual thought. Positive knowledge was the 
goal. The scientific method was seen as objectivity itself 
61 
and there was no need to ask about any existence outside 
scientific expression. The generalization of this attitude 
convinced many that questions about God, existence, and 
immortality were denied objective confirmation in advance. 
Advocates of positive knowledge put their faith in 
sociology for knowledge about human affairs and conduct. 
Psychology, as a science of the individual, was in its 
infancy. James encouraged psychology to break away from 
philosophy and be organized to study physiological and 
psychical operations by scientific method. What remained 
outside of all of these sciences was an understanding of 
reason that was capable of answering the question of "why" 
things happen at all. To opt for absolute idealism that 
deduced a total, logical system was, of course, limiting 
oneself to logical things. 
The absolute separation of the empirical and the 
ideal with their arbitrarily exclusive nature seemed 
incapable of admitting life as it was lived. Philosophic 
opinion was in the form of the uncertain situation for 
which Kant had recalled the term "pragmatic." For 
according to Kant, to be wise in human life there was a 
6 
need for knowledge based on empiricism and futurism. 
Responding to the need for a moral philosophy to guide 
human action, these five philosophers of action each 
developed a system of knowledge derived from the 
62 
arrangement of three perspectives-empiricism, futurism and 
spiritualism. In accordance with Kant's rule, they each 
suggest a theory of truth and a method by which to prove 
its meaning. 
James' Pragmatism differed from others, such as 
Peirce's, which was primarily concerned with scientific 
knowledge. Concern with all human experiences attach James 
to these French philosophers and it attachs them all to a 
pragmatism in the spirit of Kant. Capronigri summarized 
Kant's conception of pragmatism: "Th~ term refers to an 
insight into the entire situation of man in the world of 
7 
experience and the way in which he makes his way in it." 
It was a term for the perspective of the human point of 
view. Capronigri made the point well by stressing the 
dynamism and inclusiveness of James' concern with action in 
scientific inquiry, moral action, and relic;,ious 
affirmation. For James, man acts with a view towards 
something. 
James' initial reaction against scientism, or 
"vicious intellectualism," was stimulated by much the same 
personal response common to many. It was a shock to 
personal conceptions of one's own identity for it to be 
asserted that mechanism was man's essential nature. 
Individual identity had been comprised of considering that 
man was special. The fact that man had a responsibility 
63 
and had special abilities to achieve in life, gave life 
meaning. Man's will and reason worked together. To take 
away those aspects that were special to man, was to alter 
the conception that people had of themselves as individuals 
and left them unmoored altogether. These philosophers of 
action each state their philosophic motive as the desire to 
answer the question of the meaning of life in a way that 
accommodated the private and social needs of a scientific 
ac::Je. 
James: His Thought and Philosophical Problems 
Philosophy does not come full-blown, it is made. 
James' philosophy began with the inheritance of his 
father's intellect, his generously democratic perspective, 
his essentially spiritual nature, his courage, and his 
father's despair. Henry James, Sr., had thoroughly imbued 
William James with Emmanuel Swedenborg's (1688-1772) 
doctrines. William James was always concerned with the 
"point of departure" for Swedenborg's doctrines that also 
interested Kant; namely, "The conviction of the existence 
of a constant mutual influence between the mental and the 
8 
material, between the spiritual and the natural." The 
effort to unify these parts accounted for the despair of 
both father and son. 
Although his father had a pervasive effect on the 
formation and orientation of James' intellect, there were a 
64 
number of others to whom James readily acknowledged his 
intellectual debt. Among those James singled out were 
Charles Renouvier and Henri Bergson. James' contacts with 







of the introduction of 
James read Renouvier's 
Deuzieme Essaie in 1870, after several years of personal 
crisis that included depression and despair about the 
meaning of his life. 
Referring to the despair he had experienced at this 
time, James told his son, Henry, that the experience 
attributed to a "Frenchman" in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (hereafter referred to as Varieties) 
was actually James' own. James recounted there his 
encounter with the idea of capricious fate. He was unable 
to ignore "that pit of insecurity beneath the surface of 
life." James' period of despair reached a turning point as 
recorded in his April 30, 1870, diary entry: 
I think yesterday was a crisis in my life. I 
finished the first part of Renouvier's 2nd Essay 
and saw no reason why his definition of free-will--
'The sustaining of a thought because I choose to 
when I might have other thoughts'--need be the 
definition of an illusion. At any rate I will 
assume for the present--until next year--that it is 
no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to 
believe in free will.IO 
The agnosticism of positivism and the rigidity of 
Absolute Idealism left James in a metaphysical quandry. 
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James vowed to "abstain from speculation and voluntarily 
cultivate the feeling of moral freedom" by reading as well 
as acting. He felt that later he might be able to take up 
metaphysical study and skepticism "without danger to my 
powers of action. For the present, then, remember: Care 
11 
little for speculation/much for the form of my action." 
him: 
November 2, 1872, James wrote to Renouvier to thank 
"Thanks to you I possess for the first time an 
12 
intelligible and reasonable conception of freedom." James 
placed himself on the side of free will, which required 
that there be more than one option, in 1870, before he <3ot 
his first professional job as instructor of anatomy and 
physiology at Harvard in 1873. His reason for living could 
reside in the fact that he had a duty to fulfill that was 
not automatically assured; he could affect his world. The 
correspondence between James and Renouvier and the study of 
James' works led Perry to the conclusion: "Renouvier was 
the greatest individual influence upon the development of 
13 
James' thought." 
Charles Renouvier's conception of the will as free 
and its role as the central truth on which moral philosophy 
should be built, became James' own. We must understand the 
problem of free will within Renouvier's thought and context 
in order to understand in what ways James was carried into 
participation with the French movement of intellectual and 
66 
spiritual integralism that developed during the last half 
of the 19th Century. 
Charles Bernard Renouvier (1815-1903) studied at the 
I 
Ecole Polytechnique at Paris at the time Comte was there as 
an acting instructor in mathematics. Although an 
influential philosopher through the publication of books 
and journals, Renouvier never occupied a place in the 
French educational system. He was a believer in freedom 
and in the French Republic. In 1848 he published Manuel 
republicain de l'homme et du citoyen, (Republican Handbook 
on Man and the Citizen), and he continued his political 
thought through the pages of the journal, La Critique 
14 
philosophigue begun in 1872. 
Comte's claim to objective truth by his positive 
method and his intrusion of science into philosophical 
discourse, not only failed in its consideration of 
psychology and ethics, it also brought a reaction against 
15 
his rigid conception of knowledge by Charles Renouvier. 
Renouvier's philosophy, called "Personalism" or "Neo-
Criticism," claimed to carry Kant's work beyond Kant as 
applied to the contemporary situation. 
Copleston differentiated Renouvier from Kant in the 
following ways: 1) Renouvier objected to the "thing-in-
itself" and held that the phenomenal and the real were the 
same. 2) Renouvier's categories were all derived from 
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experience of relation, i.e. nothing could be known except 
as related; these included "number, position, becoming, 
quality, causality, finality or purposesiveness and 
personality," none of which could be deduced "a priori by 
transcendental method." 3) Renouvier maintained there was 
no "distinction" between knowledge and belief. In all 
knowledge the "intervention" of the will meant there was a 
personal element, although reason or will could dominate 
according to the activity. Freedom was a "datum of moral 
consciousness;" it could not be demonstrated by 
reductionism. "For Renouvier, the concept of rights has 
meaning only within a social context;" however, individuals 
had moral duties. For "there is a relation between what he 
is and his higher or ideal self and he is obligated to 
realize his higher self in his character and conduct." For 
Copleston, much in James resembled Renouvier's regard for 
personality "as the highest category and as the developed 
16 
form of the abstract category of relation." 
Eastwood posited that Kant "vindicated" practical 
reason at the expense of pure reason, and saw Renouvier and 
James as Kant's heirs in the sense that they both 
sacrifice the "age-long demand for an intelligible 
universe" to the "ideas of liberty and of the 
17 
individual." Wahl, in The Pluralist Philoso~hies of 
England and America, placed Renouvier as a pragmatist, 
68 
which Wahl defined as one "who takes vital necessities into 
18 
account and wills the power to act." Based on the action 
that follows the will Renouvier's rationally practical 
beliefs included the "moral postulates of human liberty, 
19 
the existence of God and individual immortality." Like 
Pascal, Renouvier found that the man of science, faith, 
morals and religion could not be separated. 
For Renouvier, the will presupposed intelligence and 
passion, which meant that pure and practical reason could 
20 
not be separated as Kant had done. There was no absolute 
necessity independent of will. There was no ~utonomous 
authority to be known outside of the individual. The 
highest possibilities for man depended upon the relation 
achieved between man and his environment. Renouvie.r 
continued Kant's line of thought by extending the 
fundamental role of belief in both pure and practical 
reason, making both subject to the will, thereby crossing 
the line Kant had drawn between the objective and the 
subjective. 
Renouvier called himself a philosopher of action 
because he found the fundamental truth of man in the action 
of will. Man's will was free and could "break the logical 
continuity of a mechanical series and be the initial cause 
21 
of another series of phenomena." Contingency and liberty 
could not be "excluded from the world of concrete 
69 
phenomena." On this basis, both Renouvier and Boutroux 
critiqued the idea of absolute necessity. The actuality of 
subjectivity meant free will; the individual was not forced 
by an external authority to decide or behave in only one 
particular fashion. It meant the possibility of pluralism 
in the perceptual and conceptual world and the interaction 
between the two. These philosophers of action held these 
views thereby bringing Kant's idealism into a new 
relationship with their contemporary thought. Crawford 
placed Renouvier's ethics of duty, as the "kernal of his 
philosophic thought;" that is, morality "depends upon 
22 
responsibility and responsibility depends on freedom." 
His political theory was his philosophy in action. Its 
applicability to the Third French Republic's political 
problems reveals its humanistic orientation. 
As noted in Chapter II, the Third French Republic 
found its philosophical position uncertain. The opposition 
position of the Liberals during the two preceeding regimes 
had left them without a philosophy because they had "only 
wanted freedom for themselves, unconcerned with its general 
extension." They had no philosophy of individualism, of 
individual rights valid "equally for all classes and 
individuals," because they were absolutists for their own 
interests. For Soltau, Renouvier was the "One writer there 
is who may be said so to have grasped the essentials of 
70 
individualism as to base thereon a true philosophy of 
23 
Liberalism." 
Renouvier's political theory provided the liberal 
philosophy needed. French Liberalism proved itself 
inadequate to resolve the religious problem because it was 
seen in terms of two irreconcilable forces. On the other: 
hand, for Renouvier society had two bases; 1) the 
individual, and 2) the fact of human solidarity; "each man 
[was] as an end in, and to, himself, equlpped with the 
means of realizing that end, with the help of others if 
24 
needs be, and if possible. ti 
The individual and social were inextricably involved. 
Renouvier insisted on the moral progress of the individual 
first because moral development was "both the basis and the 
end of all society, and the sole criterion of its 
rightness, moral progress being the only real form of 
25 
progress." In Individualism, the person's conscience was 
the basis for conduct. In place of Comtism's external, 
objective view, Renouvier's philosophy was trained on the 
internal, subjective concern of the individual's needs for: 
action in everyday affairs and personal life, guided by a 
morality that sought to make the world progress. 
From 1897-1900, Renouvier's conceptions of the 
individual/social relationship slowly built up a republican 
response as the Dreyfus Affair became a national crisis. 
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Because Dreyfus was a Jewish military officer, religious, 
political and social issues were involved in finding guilt 
or not. As the nation worked its way through the issues, 
the idea of strict justice "for the individual" as an 
essential "condition of any social order" gained advocates. 
Many republicans came to the conclusion "that clericalism 
and militarism of a certain type had become real dangers to 
26 
a Republican system." 
James adopted Renouvier's conception of free will 
with its focus on human action as a critical test of 
contemporary problems. In an 1873 notice in The Nation, 
James called attention to La Critigue Philosophigue and the 
doctrines of Charles Renouvier and their differences from 
British Empiricism. Renouvier's originality was in 
positing the "possibility of absolute beginnings, or of 
free will." Renouvier made an act of self affirmation the 
heart of philosophic thought. Liberty was the center of 
the system, which made it a moral philsophy. Republicanism 
27 
was the "political corollary of free will in philosophy." 
An act of liberty was central to Renouvier's conception of 
free will. 
In an 1876 article in The Nation, James gave further 
specification of the merits of Renouvier's thought over 
that of the English philosopher Bain. The differences 
between Renouvier and the British were: 1) Renouvier did 
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not consider a fact, or phenomenon "apart from its group, 
law, or function." Man's acts were at times "original 
commencements of series of phenomena, whose realization 
28 
excludes other series which were possible." For 
Renouvier, "the minimum of faith produces the maximum of 
result." Renouvier praised James for his "masterly" account 
of the "new empiricism" that departed from the "emp.irist.ic, 
associationist and deterministic doctrines of the English 
29 
on questions of substance, certitude and free will." 
James noted that the confus.ion in philosophy was a 
result of the philosopher concealing his motives: "The 
reasons ostensibly put forward by a philosopher formed but 
a small portion of his real premises." James directed the 
reader to "the masterly remarks of Ch. Renouvier in the 
30 
Critique Philosophigue, for Novem 29th, 1877." James' 
acknowledgement of the subjective element in philosphy was 
extended to science, morals and religion. 
James saw Renouvier as furthering Hu mean 
phenomena 1 ism, i.e. experiential facts exist, and James 
adopted Renouvier's conception of phenomena as having 
31 
meaning as relations within a given context. James' 
' reading of Renouvier's Deuxieme Essais gave him his 
f ideism, his "defense of voluntary belief." It was not 
that will could act directly on the body, rather, will 
worked by virtue of dwelling on an idea, which became 
73 
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expressed in action. By basing their philosophies on 
belief, both Renouvier and James based their philosophies 
33 
on a subjective basis. 
Man's individual value rested on the question of 
freedom. "Are We Automaton" and "Reflect Action and 
Theism" (1881) show Renouvier's lasting influence as 
therein James upheld "thinking-feeling-consciousness" as a 
"process of interaction." He located moral purpose and 
34 
causal explanations in operations of the mind and brain. 
James espoused Renouvier's argument for freedom, placing 
them both in the history of French subjectivism, 
voluntarism and fideism: "thinking must be free if it is 
to be either true or false; so that it can mean nothing to 
discuss the question of freedom unless one is free to 
35 
affirm or deny it." 
Perry included Renouvier's position as one held by a 
number of professors in France who were fighting 
"traditional rationalism and positivism." Important for 
James' pluralism was Renouvier's view "that the whole is an 
expression of the interaction of originally independent 
forces." There was a unity, a whole of related entities, 
but the unity did not predetermine the many. Perry 
maintained that it was from this idea that James grounded 
his position of the "priority of part to whole." James and 
74 
Renouvier join freedom and discontinuity and the need for a 
36 
"practical spirit in philosophy." 
The question of free will versus determinism was the 
main question of interest to James for the first two 
decades (1870-1890) of his professional career. This 
period corresponded to his teaching of anatomy and 
physiology and the writing of The Principles of Psychology 
(1890). From 1890 onward, James concerned himself with the 
37 
metaphysical problems encumbent upon pluralism. 
In Some Problems of Philosophy, the last text 
prepared by James and published posthumously, James again 
acknowledged his debt: 
He [Charles Renouvier] was one of the greatest of 
philosophic characters, and but for the decisive 
impression made on me in the seventies by his 
masterly advocacy of pluralism, I might never have 
got free from the monistic superstition under which 
I had grown up. The present volume, in short, 
might never have been written. This is why, 
feeling endlessly thankful as I do, I dedicate this 
textbook to the great Renouvier's memory.38 
The inspiration of Pascal and the influence of Kant 
for both Renouvier and James continued to inform James' 
works and provided the germinating seed for his Pragmatism. 
James applied Pascal's "Wager" in his 1896 essay, "The Will 
to Believe." James argued that both science and religion 
had in common the fact that ultimate actuality depended on 
the action of belief. Hypotheses were formed according to 
ideas of what was potentially true. It was only on this 
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basis that man acted at all. The consequences of acting on 
these beliefs determined their truth. Hypotheses were to 
be based on ideas drawn from empirical datum, which 
included the effects of relations between all aspects of 
concrete experience. James believed an optimistic faith 
could be based on an empiricism that included relations as 
phenomena. Kuk lick aptly 
39 
called James' pl ura 1 ism, 
"voluntaristic idealism." By stressing the role of 
belief, James sought to convince the scientists and 
philosophers in the audience of the common element of 
belief based on the requirements of action in all inquiry. 
In view of the information being supplied by the 
sciences, philosophers were encouraged to look to concrete 
experience to understand the facts produced in physiology, 
psychology, and biology. Their efforts were to be directed 
towards explaining them in some sort of unified frame, 
without arbitrarily excluding parts of the multiplicity of 
human experience. In particular, James was concerned that 
English Empiricism was tending towards determinism. 
James' concern was based on the fact that many 
empiricists found no basis for absolute certainty except 
"momentarily" in the immediate presence of particular 
facts. For them, isolated facts were susceptible of 
objective knowing. Relations between facts were not 
susceptible of direct knowledge as they were secondary 
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effects of association and habit. A world view confined to 
the assertion of particular facts, left life as it was 
individually lived as "so much dust." James believed it 
was possible to develop a pluralistic, open-ended, yet 
comprehensible view of the world that could serve as a 
warranted guide for life. 
In contradistinction to the direction empiricists 
were taking, the absolute idealists erred by the opposite 
extreme. In "The Function of Cognition" James objected to 
the Hegelidn School for trying to "shove simple sensation 
out of the pale." They considered "A perception detached 
from all others, being out of all relation, has no 
qualities--is simply nothing. 
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than we can see vacancy." 
We can no more consider it 
For them, all was concept. 
Thought, as the relations of knowledge, was considered a 
better kind of consciousness than one of feelings. "Their 
all in all is mental life." On the other hand, James 
maintained that percepts were primary realities. Their 
existence prompted the naming of an object and showed that 
cognition functioned as a knowing something that "does 
41 
exist elsewhere than in it." James was clearly opposed 
to the truth of both absolute objectivity and extreme 
dualism, which unalterably separated the knower from the 
known and placed the idea of something as more real than 
the thing itself. 
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Returning to "The Function of Cognition" as he 
collected the essays he wanted bound together as a 
statement of his metaphysics in 1909, James noted that "The 
reader will see how much of the account of the truth-
function developed later in Pragmatism (1907) was in this 
42 
earlier article." According to James, he "distinctly 
asserted" in 1884: 
1) The reality, external to the true idea; 2) The 
critic, reader, or epistemologist, with his own 
belief, as warrant for this reality's existence; 3) 
The experienceable environment, as the vehicle or 
medium connecting knower with known, and yielding 
the cognitive relation; 4) The elimination of the 
'epistemological gulf,' so that the whole truth-
relation falls inside of the continuities of 
concrete experience, and is constituted of 
particular processes, varying with every object and 
subject, and susceptible of being described in 
detail. 
The defects of this earlier account: 1) The 
imperfect development of the generalized notion of 
the workability of the feeling or idea as 
equivalent to that satisfactory adaptation to the 
particular reality, which constitutes the truth of 
the idea. 2) The treatment, on page 151, of 
percepts as the only realm of reality. I now treat 
concepts as a co-ordinate realm.43 
In 1884, then, he had not worked out his theory of the 
function of ideas. The truth-relation was asserted as 
within concrete experience. However, explaining how it 
worked was before him. 
In the 1897 Preface to The Will to Believe, James' 
noted his metaphysical position and his objections to the 
position of other philosophic views. "Ever not quite" was 
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James final word on discovering absolute unity between all 
the facts given prima facie in the world; the world was a 
44 
pluralism. In this 1897 presentation of his philosophic 
"attitude," James objected to rationalists and "half-way" 
empiricists such as, positivists, agnostics and scientific 
naturalists because they were monists, they believed in an 
absolute unity. They believed "That the world could appear 
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as an absolutely single fact." 
James made a point of differentiating his philosophy 
from both absolute idealism and empiricists who posited a 
closed system. He would call his philosophical position 
Radical Empiricism, defined as: "This is pluralism. He 
who takes for his hypothesis the notion that it is the 
permanent form of the world is what I call a radical 
empiricist." For James, pluralism was to be found in 
nature, religion and morals; there were real beginnings 
and real ends. The old empiricisms, those he called "half-
way," should adopt a radical view and stop trying to 
"overcome or reinterpret" the common-sense given plurality 
46 
into a grand scheme. For James, "Real possibilities, ... a 
real God, and a real moral life, just as common-sense 
conceives these things, may remain in empiricism as 
conceptions." However, James had not formulated his 
explanation of the relations between concepts and percepts, 
between mind and body. 
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James' essay "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical 
Results" (1898) marked the beginning of the pragmatic 
movement as James applied Pierce's conception of pragmatism 
to religion. James proposed the question, "Is matter the 
producer of all things, or is a God there too?" The answer 
was to be obtained by the rule that the meaning "of any 
philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some 
particular consequence, in our future practical experience, 
47 
whether active or passive." 
James' Gifford Lectures, delivered in 1901-02, were 
published in Varieties in 1902. In Varieties, James 
applied pragmatism to the religious experience to ascertain 
what could be asserted about religious experiences based on 
their consequences. James wrote Varieties out of the 
conviction that the religious life as a whole was man's 
48 
most important function. He was interested in the 
private experience. He asked the audience to take the 
meaning of religion as: 
... the feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to 
whatever they may consider the divine. Since the 
relation may be either moral, physical, or ritual, 
it is evident that out of religion in the sense in 
which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and 
ecclesiastical organizations may secondarily 
grow.49 
In the Postscript in Varieties, James briefly stated 
his philosophic position and promised to elaborate in a 
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later work. In the Postscript, James divided thinkers into 
"naturalists and supernaturalists;" and, he divided the 
latter into "universalistic supernaturalism" and the 
"crasser, piecemeal" sort of supernaturalism, allying 
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himself with the second variety. James set forth his 
religious and metaphysical over-beliefs, which admitted: 1) 
The ideal and the real worlds mix. 2) The ideal region 
could be counted as one of the "forces that causally 
determine the real world's details;" an individual in 
communion with the "Ideal" brings new force into the 
world. 3) There was a power "other and larger than our 
conscious selves," concerned with the personal details of 
individual lives. 4) "It might conceivably even be only a 
larger and more godlike self." 5) The problem of 
universalistic conceptions, such as Transcendental 
Idealism, was in seeing "A world of fact!--an entire world 
is the smallest unit." James declared his belief in a 
powerful being and in a "spiritual relation between this 
being and ourselves." Furthermore, the "direct action of 
this being upon the details and the whole of our universe" 
was asserted. However, James' conception of the action of 
51 
this being excluded any idea of coercive necessity. 
James concluded that the relation between religion 
and "supernormal memory and cognitions" was through 
mysticism. For James, feeling and reason went together, 
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but there would be no religion if it depended on 




These determined our activity and reason 
James' assertions about spiritual experiences were 
firm. However, he did not have a complete metaphysical 
explanation that harmonized the various questions encumbent 
upon philosophy. As noted, looking back in 1909 on his 
1884 essay, "The Function of Cognition," James said that it 
was not until Pragmatism (1907) that he changed his 
position and was able to "treat concepts as a co-ordinate 
realm" of reality. Admitting concepts and percepts as "co-
ordinate" realms of reality left him with a troublesome 
dualism. Between 1900 and 1910, James concentrated on 
formulating a non-dualistic metaphysics. 
Working from his adoption of Renouvier's conception 
of free will, from 1900 to his death in 1910 James 
developed the pragmatic rule into a theory of meaning with 
its corresponding metaphysical position of radical 
empiricism as a "non-dualistic formulation of the canvass 
of experience." During this time, his association with 
Henri Bergson helped James clarify his thought and 
connected him further with these philosophers of action. 
Perry concluded that Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was 
"the most important philosophical and personal attachment 
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of James' later years." Both James and Bergson were 
interested in biology and the questions about man's role in 
the evolutionary process. What was the place of mind, 
imagination, and creativity? As Levi's analysis showed, 
Bergson's naturalistic explanation "of the persistence of 
the anti-intellectual in experience" was also a "pragmatic 
54 
argument for religion and myth." It was this perspective 
that Bergson and James shared. 
I 
Bergson's Essai sur les donnees immediates de la 
conscience, translated as Time and Free Will, was published 
in 1889, and read by James in 1889. Bergson's 
\ 
Matiere and Memorie (Matter and Memory) was published in 
1896, and read by James in 1896. James reread both books 
in 1902 and commented: "Nothing in years has so excited and 
stimulated my thought. Before I couldn't understand 
Bergson--now Bergson brings things into a solution from 
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which new crystals can be got." 
In 1903, James expressed his frustration that he had 
not had the time to write his book on metaphysics. His 
mind was "working on the infernal old problem of mind and 
brain, and how to construct the world out of pure 
experience." The rereading of Bergson in 1902 had 
stimulated his thinking. James was sure that a systematic 
account of his philosophy of pure experience could be 
written; "his system shall be a genuine empiricist 
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pluralism." He would resolve the problem of dualism by 
pluralistic empiricist tenents. 
In his "Syllabus of Philosophy 3 (1902-03),"' James 
presented a summation of his thought up to that time. A 
reading of the Syllabus reveals James' struggle to organize 
the aspects of his thought in order to be able to write a 
book on his metaphysics. James presented the justification 
for the following views: 1) "'Pure Experience' agrees 
with common sense: Our various minds "terminate" at 
percepts (physical things), which they experience in 
common." 2 ) The absolute unity of the world was a 
"sterile" understanding of the word "system." After the 
fact, it applied even to a chaos, as "systematically 
interadapted to that effect," and 3) "Tychism as an 
ultimate hypothesis. 
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world as it comes. 
Chance, freedom" were given in the 
James looked to common sense in order 
to negate closed conceptions of reality. 
In his "Syllabus," James also made his case for a 
philosophy that included phenomenal relations and ideals. 
In the case of relations, he listed forms of consciousness 
of transition: "continuity, activity, causality, change, 
development, help, hindrance, fulfilment, etc." Regarding 
ideals, the originals of all of these were "subjective 
aspects of experience." His conception of relations and 
ideals derived from tychism based on free will. James 
B4 
choose to justify tychism (chance) on three grounds, which 
reflect his overall concerns: 
I. Scientific: No concrete experience ever repeats 
itself. II. Moral reasons: Tychism, essentially 
pluralistic, goes with empiricism, personalism, 
democracy, and freedom. It believes that unity is 
in process of being won. Tychism and "external 
relation" stand or fall together. They mean 
genuine individuality. III. Metaphysical reasons: 
Tychism eliminates the "problem of evil" from 
theology. It has affinities with common-sense in 
representing the Divine as finite and avoids 
Monism's doubling-up the world into two editions. 
For Tychism, things come in instalments, causing 
change. Continuous change would give us the 
completed infinite. Time and space may be 
infinite, the "quantity of being" is finite. Time 
and space may be infinite without contradicting 
logic.58 
With tychism, God need not be held responsible for evil. 
However, continuous change according to chance made the 
world precariously chaotic. The relation between mind and 
matter required clarification in order to conceive of 
guides for effective action. 
Still working on his metaphysics, in 1904 James 
outlined a proposal for a philosophy of pure experience. 
James wanted to overcome the separation that had occurred 
throughout the history of philosophy of the subject and its 
object. For James this was an artificial conception of a 
dualism that did not exist if the cognitive relation was 
understood correctly. By "pure," James meant that 
experience was neutral. There was a general "stuff prior 
to the object and the subject distinction," its mental oi: 
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physical being was determined by which 
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"group of 
associates" we tended to connect it with. Pure experience 
was sensation, prior to mind-matter distinction. His was a 
universe that seemed chaotic, where no one connection ran 
through all experiences. There was no one single entity 
nor place that could be considered the center capable of 
knowing everything at once. Pure experience was the 
"immediate flux of life which furnishes material to our 
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later reflections with its categories." 
James concluded in 1904 that a philosophy of pure 
experience seemed to harmonize best with radical pluralism, 
novelty, indeterminism, moralism, theism and humanism. At 
this time he was not sure if all of these doctrines were 
necessary; the points of difference were so many that it 
could only be built up by contributions of "many co-
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operating minds." At the time of his death in 1910, 
James had kept all of these doctrines except theism, which 
was acceptable but did not rule out panpsychism. His call 
for many cooperating minds occurred just at the time of his 
recognition of the likeness between his thought and 
Bergson's. 
James wrote Bergson in 1902 congratulating him for 
his "conclusive demolition of the dualism of object and 
subject in perception" in Bergson's Time and Free Will. In 
1903, James expressed confidence that Bergson's philosophy 
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of "pure experience" could be worked out with the hope that 
it would help reconcile the opposition of the philosophic 
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schools towards each other. James also told Bergson that 
he agreed "thoroughly" with Bergson's "critical points" in 
his 1903 Introduction to Metaphysics, which James had read 
I 
in the Revue de Metaphysigue et de Morale. After reading 
Bergson, James applied himself to the questions of co-
consciousness and causality. 
The questions of co-consciousness and of the 
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relations of what was "possible" needed to be worked out. 
These questions, of unity and causality, were difficult for 
a metaphysics of empiricism, like James', that allowed no 
recourse to trans-empirical explanations such as an 
"Unknowable" or intellectualistic conceptions of an 
"Absolute Mind." The dilemma was expressed as the problem 
of the relationship between the "One" and the "Many." If 
all things were a unity (the "One") then the world WdS d 
closed system and its individual parts (the "Many") had 
their course predetermined for them. This attitude led to 
what James called a "moral holiday" because the end result 
of man's life was fixed. If there was a trans-empirical 
perfect unity, or God, how to account for evil remained a 
problem. 
His thought on co-consciousness challenged the 
position he had held in The Principles of Psychology 
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(1890). James had maintained that each field of 
consciousness was indivisible. However, in his 1905 
article, "How Two minds Can Know One Thing," which sought 
to explain the relationship between mind and body (or idea 
and object), James concluded that the same object could be 
known by two knowers. This meant that an identical part 
could be in two fields of consciousness. "The fields are 
decomposable into parts, one of which is common to both." 
He had to overhaul the "whole business of connection, 
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confluence, and the like, and do it radically." 
For two and one-half years, beginning in 1905, James 
kept a notebook of over 300 pages in which he tried to work 
out his basic problem, as Perry put it, of how to conceive 
of experience as able to retain two sets of properties 
"composing both the immediate and the transient life of the 
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subject and the stable world of common objects." That is 
to say, James still had to work out the relation of 
concepts to percepts. 
After reading Bergson's L'Evolution creatrice in 
1907, James began to conceive of a way to explain co-
consciousness by altering his conception of tychism as 
necessary for free will. James wrote to Bergson: 
The position we are rescuing is "Tychism" and a 
really growing world. But whereas I have hitherto 
found no better way of defending Tychism than by 
affirming the spontaneous addition of discrete 
elements of being (or their subtraction), thereby 
playing the game with intellectualist weapons, you 
set things straight at a single stroke by your 
fundamental conception of the continuously creative 
nature of reality.66 
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In a letter to James Ward in 1909, William James further 
clarified his new view: 
None of my students became good tychists! Nor am I 
one any longer, since Bergson's synechism has shown 
me another way of saving novelty and keeping all 
the concrete facts of law-in-change. Giving up the 
logic of identity as the means of understanding the 
essences of concrete things, ... we put the world of 
concepts in its definite and indispensable place; 
we allow novelty to be ... Not tychism then, but 
synechism [continuity] (if we must talk Greek) is 
the solution.67 
James abandoned the "logic of identity," which held 
that the "units of reality" were either identical or not, 
and adopted Bergson's real time of "duration." James was 
then able to resolve the two problems of his metaphysics of 
pure experience: "the status of possibilities and the 





precisely was the nature of pure 
James presented his experiential metaphysics in A 
Pluralistic Universe (1909). It was designed to meliorate 
the division between mind and matter by explaining their 
relationship. Concepts cut up the movement of life. 
Reality and rationality were not "in perfect agreement." 
Men act on concepts projecting them into the future. 
Concepts were practical, but had "no theoretic value" 
because they gave no insight into "the inner life of the 
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flux." Sensational experience gave the causal 
connection. 
Metaphysics could go where conceptual science could 
not. As philosophers of action, James and Bergson were 
interested in process, in life as evolving. Life as 
continuous creative movement meant each moment was self-
transcendent. Abandoning the conceptual, or "discursive 
form," allowed the continuity of real experience in its 
manyness-in-oneness. In reality, the relations of things, 
cause and effect, time and space, were "integral members of 
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the sensational flux." 
Following Kant's postulate, James' critique of the 
principles of knowing led to the substantiation of a 
metaphysics of pure experience with its "doctrine of 
compenetration" and his assertion of a philosophy of 
ctction, which viewed life as a process of creative 
becoming. The relation between the one and the many, the 
subject and object, concept and percept, was not one or 
adding and substracting in a continuous change. Each pulse 
of experience flowed into the next, "the first develops 
into the second, the second emerges from the 
first ... novelty then seems natural and reasonable, like the 
71 
fulfillment of a tendency." 
In his notebook of answers to the critisms of his 
doctrine of "pure experience," James concluded: "The 
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constitution of reality which I am making for is of {the] 
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psychic type." Kant had placed the self outside of time 
and space in order to free it from the necessity of the 
laws of nature. By critiquing pure reason, James followed 
Renouvier's lead in eliminating the absolute division 
between the external and the internal (or personal) and 
placed the reality of both in the environment and the self 
in the compenetrating movement of experience. The prestige 
of reason rested in its pragmatic use in the business of 
life, which should be the moral progress of man. James' 
philosophy of action was an intrinsically willed humanism 
that included God and man in an open-ended, self-
transcendent process of becoming in concrete experience 
where the unity was in the making. 
As men of science, both James and Bergson believed 
that our interest in physics was a legitimate activity and 
the method of mathematics suited physics as its object. 
However, equivalencies (the "equal" sign in mathematics on 
which the logic of identity rested) were constructed 
conventions that suited the very slow change of physical 
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nature. As noted earlier, this conception was put forth 
in Conventionalism. For both James and Bergson the basis 
for rationality in metaphysics, whose object was more 
irregular than physical nature, could not be formally 
logical if we were to understand the conduct of freedom. 
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The role of irrational impulses in life was too abundant 
and required a method constructed for the general nature of 
experience manifest in action. 
Although Bergson's philosophy was considerably 
different from James' as a whole, they both worked to 
resolve the conflict between science and religion because 
theology and philosophy were both concerned with ultirn.:ite 
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questions. Their efforts fall within the movement of 
their time to delineate fields of inquiry and to liberate 
philosophy so that it could develop a metaphysics that 
allowed the philosopher to approach, with equal edse, the 
various conceptual frameworks employed in each discipline. 
Both James and Bergson saw themselves as taking part 
in an identifiable movement. Bergson maintained that he 
and James shared a desire to work out a philosophy "more 
genuinely empirical, closer to the immediately given." 
Bergson and James were "attached" by way of their mutual 
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insistence that reality is continuous and "open-ended." 
Reacting against Comtism's proclaimed "end of metaphysics," 
both Bergson and James founded a metaphysics on the 
conscious experience of continuity. Emphasizing continuity 
corrected the "abstract timelessness of the 
76 
intellectualistic view." Bergson emphasized that the 
most important link between himself and James was the 
"movement of ideas which has for some years been in 
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evidence everywhere and which arises from causes that are 
77 
general and profound." The task in common to James and 
Bergson was to "reconcile the partial truth of conceptual 
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knowledge with the fuller truth of immediacy." For both, 
the compenetration of reality before conceptualization 
meant that man was conceived as knowing an object from the 
inside by intuition and an act of "intellectual sympathy." 
A Pluralistic Universe and Some Problems of Philosop-
h:i. entail new elements developing in James' thought as he 
conceived the implications of a life of becoming, common to 
all things, where action towards the ideal form of human 
life was within empirical reality. The next task is to see 
how his pragmatic method substantiated his metaphysics of 
pure experience based on the evolutionary conception of the 
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CHAPTER IV 
WILLIAM JAMES, MAURICE BLONDEL AND EMILE BOUTROUX 
In the 19th Century, empiricists, absolute idealists 
ground, 
Their 
and positivists increasingly could find no common 
other than their belief in objective fact. 
conception of objectivity resulted in the posing of 
question of the relation between science and religion 
terms of opting for one or the other. The conception 





truth was based on fixed, unified external fact, like the 
laws of nature. The idea that a law was an objective 
invariable necessity and consequently an eternal truth led 
to the assumption that ultimate questions, which were the 
concerns of philosophy, should be answered in terms of 
fixed laws. The volitional, or passional, which informed 
.religious faith, 
and thus seen as 
was individual, personal and irrational, 
incapable of objective confirmation. A 
review of the respective positions of the three main views 
will lead us to the discussion of the relations between 
James, Blondel and Boutroux. 
Metaphysical idealists objectified Kant's conceptual 
categories and claimed to deduce the unfolding of reality 
by conceptual categories. Positing an objective Absolute 
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Ego that manifested itself in the activity of thought, Neo-
Kantians of the metaphysical variety excluded sensational 
experience from philosophy. On the other hand, empiricists 
viewed the phenomenal world as the reality with which 
philosophy was concerned. Their warrant for metaphysical 
assertions about existence was limited to what could be 
certified by isolated moments of phenomena. Positivists 
eliminated supernatural speculation altogether, thereby 
placing metaphysical or religious considerations outside of 
the knowing relation. Each way of approaching the world 
was a closed system exclusive of others. Each was tending 
towards determinism. Especially vexing was the 
materialistic attitude developing among empiricists and 
positivists. James, Blonde! and Boutroux tried to 
meliorate these divisions by defining philosophical inquiry 
as inclusive of the whole of man's relations in life. They 
developed their philosophies of action as an alternative 
view that allowed an approach to phenomena, inclusive of 
all experience, as it was manifested in action. 
James' Pragmatism was a method and a theory of truth 
that, like Maurice Blondel's philosophy of action, was 
developed in opposition to closed, deterministic systems. 
The American pragmatic movement was said to have begun when 
William James publicly demonstrated its use as a theory of 
meaning in his lecture "Philosophical Conceptions and 
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Practical Results" (1898). In this lecture James explained 
that his objection to "materialisms grossness" rested on 
what it left out of account. For James, materialism was: 
not a permanent warrant for our more ideal 
interests, not a fulfiller of our remotest hopes. 
The notion of God, on the other hand, however 
inferior it may be in clearness to mathematic 
notions current in mechanical philosophy, has 
practical superiority over them, it guaranties an 
ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. 
This need of an eternal moral order is one of the 
deepest needs of our breasts.! 
This early statement of James' guided the development of 
his thought. The similarity in motive and development of 
thought between James and Maurice Blonde! placed them in 
the identifiable movement of philosophers of action. 
Maurice Blonde! (1861-1949), a French philosopher, 
spent his professional career in Southern France. One of 
the major influences on Blondel was his instructor Emile 
Boutroux. Boutroux had encouraged Blonde! to write a 
technical presentation of a philosophy of action. Blondel 
presented his philosophy of action in his 1893 
dissertation. However, some philosophers saw Blondel's 
philosophy as a religious apologetic, which for them, was 
unsuitable in philosophic discourse. Blondel's thought 
was dangerously outside what Said had referred to as the 
intertextual references that insures the continuity of 
particular viewpoints. Because he deviated from the 
philosophic traditions ensconced in the French educational 
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system, Blondel was refused for consideration as a 
candidate for a chair in philosophy. On Blondel's behalf, 
/ 
Boutroux appealed to his cousin, Raymond Poincare, the 
Minister of Education, to intercede for Blondel. By 
Poincar~'s initiative, Blondel was given the Chair of 
2 
Philosophy at Aix-en-Provence. 
The nature of Blondel's thought began from the sdme 
point of view affirmed above by James. Blondel's initial 
question was "how to envisage the philosophical problem in 
the light of religion" without philosophy being a 
substitute for religion or philosophy being absorbed into 
religion. His philosophy of action was developed in 
response to the division of philosophy into separate 
schools. Like James, Blondel sought to conciliate between 
the anti-metaphysical positivism and the limitations of 
3 
absolute idealism. 
Blondel's dissertation Action (1893) carried the 
general theme that man discovered himself through action 
4 
that included all of the relations of life. He saw the 
"whole man" as a unity "composed of intelligence, 
5 
feeling 
and deliberate will." He used the scientific (rational) 
method of dialectic to demonstrate the dynamic movement in 
life to the idealistic immanentists, and in order to 




Blondel began Action (1893) with the question of 
human destiny in order to examine "the meaning of 
existence" by a philosophy "open to the transcendent as yet 
7 
undefined." Like James, Blondel began his work with the 
religious option. By the dialectical movement of the work, 
Blondel showed that man could not limit his knowledge to 
objective science but must have a "science of the 
8 
subject." By examining the movement of consciousness, 
Blonde! showed how consciousness "exercises itself as 
freedom." 
Blondel explained his intention in Action (1893): 
It focused on the following two problems and with 
the attitude defined as follows: 1. A study of the 
relations between thought and action conducted in 
such a way as to constitute a critique of life and 
a science of practice, with the aim of arbitrating 
the contention between intellectualism and 
pragmatism [the purely secular variety] lhrough a 
'philosophy of action' that includes a 'philosophy 
of the idea' instead of excluding it or limiting 
itself to it. 2. A study of the relations between 
science and belief and between the most autonomous 
philosophy and the most positive religion conducted 
in such a way as to avoid rationalism as well as 
fideism and with the aim of uncovering through a 
rational investigation the intrinsic claims of 
religion to be heard by all minds.9 
By beginning with the religious option, Blondel 
showed that the will required and directed movement so that 
a choice for no action was not possible. At the heart of 
Action (1893) was the "equating the term willed with the 
10 
principle of the voluntary aspiration itself." Practice 
did not tolerate any delay and never entailed perfect 
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clarity: "I cannot put off acting until all the evidence 
has appeared. In every act, there is an act of faith." By 
a phenomenalogy of action that included ideals for an open-
ended future, Blondel showed the incoherence of the 
positive sciences. For example, Blonde! pointed out thdt 
even "brute bodies" manifest an "internal dynamism" 
because, "The living germ effects, with the materials it 
gathers, a veritable creation, and as long as there is 
11 
life, there is a phenomenon of surplus production." The 
fact of surplus production validated the existence of 
plurality in the changes unfolded in life and obviated the 
idea of fixed, linear development. 
Blondel's philosophy of action was an attempt to 
unite the "philosophy of essence and the philosophy of 
existence" to overcome the conflict between science and 
.religion. Like James, Blonde! considered that the 
conflicts between schools derived from their "closed 
systems." By looking to "thought clarified in action and 
action clarified by reflection," he showed that thought and 
12 
action were "ultimately one." Blonde! wrote that in 
Action (1893) he had advocated "moralism," by which he 
meant to, "preserve the equilibrium of a doctrine which is 
an integral realism and which does not sacrifice either of 
13 
the aspects of being, either thought or life." Pascal was 
his inspiration for seeking being in man and the 
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constitution of a "concrete ontology" because both saw the 
problem of being as also "the problem of the spirit, of 
charity, of socialization and personalization 
14 
simultaneously." 
Initially outside of Blondel's own circle, William 
James was one of a very few who showed any interest in 
15 
Action (1893). Blondel indicated their points in common 
in 1902 when Blondel had publicly proposed the term 
"Pragmatism" for his philosophy of action. However, he 
rejected the term later because he did not want his 
philosophy of action to be confused with the brands of 
pragmatism that excluded a principle of "fixed orientation 
and progressive adaptation." Although Blondel and James 
differed in their conclusions about God's role and 
institutional religion, their basic orientation was one of 
meliorating the division of the schools by grounding 
metaphysics in the relation of thought and practice through 
action, which called for an empiricistic, futuristic, 
intrinsic philosophy. 
Blondel continued his defense of a philosophy of 
action in a 1906 article, "Le Point de Depart de la 
recherche philosophique" in the Annales de Philosophie 
Chretienne. James read the article and wrote to Blondel 
"You have stuck a magnificent note in the Annales. I have 
copied whole pages of your words." In the article, Blondel 
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had again addressed the problem of how philosophy could 
constitute both a "technical discipline" and at the same 
16 
time be "inserted into the common life of humanity." To 
do so, philosophy should start with direct knowledge that 
served as real "plans" for the totality of life that faced 
the future and "evoked it," and philosophy must use 
reflective knowledge, which by "abstraction" was 
"retrospectively analyzed." James was later to put it this 
17 
way: "We live prospectively as well as retrospectively." 
For Blondel, the relation of consciousness and action 
raised a problem for reflection as a "technical 
discipline." Resolving the problem by connecting theory 
and practice in a revolving wheel, allowed philosophy to 
pose specific problems according to their object. As 
prospective, philosophy would prepare "directive ideas' for 
life. A phenomenological method would avoid "idealistic or 
realistic" bias and get at what we actually conceive 
ourselves as being and thinking; it allowed an "inventory 
of the given" to ascertain the meaning of dynamic movement 
18 
inclusive of the mind and nature. In A Pluralistic 
Universe (1909), James' quoted Blondel, "Our thoughts 
determine our acts and our acts redetermine the previous 
nature of the world." He also quoted Blondel's placement 
of philosophy as explaining and making the world, "It 
19 
[philosophy] is of the real in the real." 
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In the Preface to Pragmatism (1907) James referred 
the reader to Blondel's article in the Annales. Like 
Blondel, in Pragmatism, James explained that "philosophy is 
prospective." After finding what "the world has been and 










one or many, 
James explained that pragmatism derived from the same 
Greek word, "meaning action, from which our words practice 
and practical come." The viewpoint of pragmatism was that 
the truth of a "state of mind means this function of a 
leading that is worth while." Truth was a process whereby 
an idea was made true by events. For James, pragmatism was 
both a theory of truth and a theory of meaning; those who 
were pragmatists turned towards "concreteness, adequacy, 
21 
facts, action and power." 
As a method for settling metaphysical disputes, 
pragmatism found the evidence for God in inner personal 
22 
experience. The fact that the world was "One" by its 
conjunctions and "many" by its disjunctions, meant that we 
could know the variety by developing "distinct programs of 
scientific work;" that is, by developing a method for 
every object. The notion of the Absolute would be 
"replaced by that of the Ultimate" because systems evolved 
109 
from human needs, which changed and developed through time. 
For James, the notions of the Absolute and the Ultimate 
were both concerned with maximizing the "unified content of 
fact" but they were opposite conceptions of time. 
23 
first was backwards, the latter forwards. 
The 
James had expressed his belief that d technical 
defense for a philosophy of practice (action) could be made 
but he had not found the time to present it himself. 
Blondel's technical defense of a philosophy of action 
firmly established a philosophic view that explained the 
relation between theory and practice. It prompted a 
metaphysics that was consonant with James desire for a 
philosophic view that began from human experience and was 
capable of approaching a pluralistic universe that allowed 
the rational and the empirical to be considered on equal 
terms. 
James worked out his metaphysics during the last ten 
years of his life, which he presented in A Pluralistic 
Universe. He stated the advantages of his philosophy that 
accommodated both rationalists and empiricists by quoting 
Blondel (Blondel's statement is the quote within this 
quote): 
Meanwhile the incompleteness of the pluralistic 
universe, thus assumed and held to as the most 
probable hypothesis, is also represented by the 
pluralistic philosophy as being self-reparative 
through us, as getting its disconnections remedied 
in part by our behavior. 'We use what we are and 
have, to know; and what we know, 
still more.' Thus do philosophy 
theory and action, work in the 
indefinitely.24 




From Blondel, James had found a way of expressing the 
contextual place of philosophic activity. Rather than 
philosophy conceived as reified expressions of fixed 
truths, James used Blondel's conception of philosophy as an 
activity in the midst of human experience. By this, they 
both were able to find a place for philosophy that did not 
separate it from the whole of human needs. Blondel's 
philosophy of action had continued the philosophic position 
that Emile Boutroux carried forward in his works and 
lectures to his students. We can look to Boutroux for the 
fundamental points that unite these philosophers of action 
and comprise those elements that make them a part of an 
identifiable movement. 
James and Emile Boutroux 
"Brute datum indistinguishable from pure accident. 
We have to try to make it seem less of an accident, 
less of an arbitrary fact." 
--William James25 
Perry asserted that a "really growing world" was "the 
theme" of the latter part of Some Problems of Philosophy, 
26 
and that this theme bound James to Bergson. The problem 
of reconciling confidence in science with the assertion of 
chance, as we have seen, was expressed, according to James, 
in a more satisfactory way by Bergson's use of continuity. 
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To more clearly understand the way Bergson, James and 
Blondel came to express so many similarities in their views 
and the fact that these similarities are evidence of their 
participation in a particular movement of the 19th Century, 
we can look to the philosophy of Emile Boutroux who was .pa 
crucial in influencing the philosophic vision of Bergson 
and Blondel who were his students. 
The separation of mind and body, the tension between 
subjectivity and objectivity rooted in conceptions about 
science and religion was so profound that these 
philosophers of action attempted to annihilate these 
exclusive oppositions. As noted, Bergson, James and Blondel 
each considered the oppositions of prevailing philosophic 
views to have reached a crisis point in the exercise of 
intellectual freedom and in the construction of a 
reasonable conception of life. Calm resides at the center 
of a storm. Emile Boutroux (1845-1921) was the calm at the 
center. 
Boutroux's education followed the course of the elite 
in the French educational system. His professional career 
was centered in Paris. He was Professor of History and 
Modern Philosophy at the Sorbonne, and a Director of the 
Foudation Thiers, from which he influencd an elite of young 
men. He was elected a member of the Institute in 1898 and 
elected a member of the French Academy in 1912. The year 
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1895 saw the republication of Boutroux's 1874 thesis, 
The Contingency of the Laws of Nature due, in part, to the 
influence of his ideas on his students, Henri Bergson and 
Maurice Blondel. Additionally, Boutroux's critique of 
science was recognized as influencing Hannequin, Payot, 
I 27 
Milhaud, Duhem and Henri Poincare. 
In a 1910 article in The Nation, "A Great French 
Philosopher At Harvard," William James gave notice to 
"converts" to pragmatism, Bergsonism, "the real empiricism, 
the real evolutionism, the real pluralism," that it was 
Emile Boutroux who had "set the ball rolling" and was the 
earliest (after Renouvier) as he is now its latest, 
28 
prophet." James noted that that which these views stood 
for could be found in Boutroux's 1874 thesis, The 
Contingency of the Laws of Nature, and that "the most 
important features of "pragmatism" and "Bergsonism" found 
clear expression in that early work." James' explication 
of his assertion is the best summation of the thesis of 
this paper. 
According to James, "M. Boutroux is, by virtue of 
priority, the leader de jure of the reaction against the 
abstract, and in favor of the concrete point of view in 
philosophy." James defined the "abstract" that Boutroux 
reacted against as the common sense notion of the 
"scholastic" point of view, which meant "the pretension to 
113 
conceive things so vigorously that your definitions shall 
29 
contain all that need be known about their objects." The 
dogmatic conclusions of rationalists was the position that 
James took his stand against in Introduction I of his 
unwritten book to be entitled "The Many and the One," which 
was to be a "conjunction of ideas, empiricism and 
spiritualism." Perry recounted that James had begun with a 
testimony to the practical "serviceability" of the 
categories of body, soul and causality, but had "suspended" 
the project at the point of taking up the divided 
philosophical positions. In these papers of 1903-04, James 
was with Boutroux against absolute systems. However, James 
30 
had not been ready to explain his metaphysical thought. 
James' notes on metaphysical problems, gathered from 
1903 onward, contain his intention to "Begin construction 
by the question of Realism vs. Idealism" in order to 
"foreshadow" his "collective pluralism, purposive impulse" 
philosophy. Perry recorded that for James, the "value of 
idealism" was in its ability to disprove the "materialistic 
view of physical nature." In this, James felt reenforced 
by Poincare's and Le Roy's conception of physical laws and 
31 
concepts being conventions, chosen for their utility. As 
noted, Poincare was heavily influenced by his association 
with Boutroux and his thought. For Boutroux science was 
reduction, and mathematics was its form "par excellence." 
114 
For science to explain the universe, would be to make it 




of the entire diversity and movement of 
Boutroux's view of science can be seen in Poincare's 
description of the functional role of ideals: 
The scientist's love of truth is not the love of 
certitude ... The faith of the scientist would rather 
resemble the faith of the heretic ... it makes us 
catch a glimpse of [entrevoir] an ideal of which we 
can have only a vague notion, and it gives us the 
confidence that, without ever permitting us to 
attain it, our efforts for approaching it will not 
be without fruit.33 
James had registered his disapproval of a rigid 
conception of science, and of men of science speculating 
about ultimate problems as early as 1874 in "The Mood of 
34 
Science and the Mood of Faith." He found a thorough 
defense of his position in Boutroux who came out against 
the followers of Comtism, or scientism, "who imagined that 
the frame of things was eternally and literally mechanical, 
and that truth was reached by abstracting from 
35 
it 
everything connected with personality." Accounting for 
life by a law, such as the conservation of energy could 
never attain the ultimate reason of things. Boutroux found 
in the evidence of evolution that "force making for change" 
36 
is "at the root of force making for conservation." 
James identified Boutroux's central thesis inclusive 
of what Boutroux was against. He was opposed to reality as 
115 
"abstracted, simplified, reduced, inalterable and self-
identical." For James, Boutroux "rescued" reason from 
"tracing identities," which classical rationalism imposed 
upon itself because, as James saw it, they considered even 
an elementary novelty equivalent to admitting "Absolute 
37 
Chance at the heart of things." For Boutroux, "identity" 
was only found in words. In nature, no two individuals 
were identical. "Nature never gives us anything but 
resemblances ... similarly, positive science does not require 
38 
the possibility of reducing all notions to unity." 
James applauded Boutroux's preference for reason as 
the "faculty of judgment in its widest sense," which 
included sentiments, willingnesses, concepts and premises. 
Boutroux examined the laws of logic, mathematics, physics, 
chemistry, biology, psychology and sociology, and concluded 
39 
that ''everything changes, except the law of change." 
Boutroux advocated ridding ourselves from "all rational 
systematisation," the single-fact, permanently-explained 
universe, and substituting "the simple design of 
40 
a 
genealogical tree." With the logic of identity, a strict 
law of cause and effect, invariably "escapes" us due to an 
41 
element of contingency in things. 
Boutroux set forth the idea of immediate experience 
as "less rigorous" than the systematisation of thought. If 
we were to eliminate "all intellectual activity, all 
116 
participation of the understanding," it would be an 
"inconceivable process." For experimental knowledge, we 
require an object and extract "the data of the senses or of 
42 
the empirical consciousness." This is similar to James' 
later notion of pure experience, which applied radical 
empiricism to the theory of knowledge and found immediate 
experience to be neutral, with the subject/object 
distinctions occurring according to interest. 
James had been concerned to lessen the effect of 
conceiving the "tychism" he early adopted as an "arbitrary 
fact." He credited Boutroux with avoiding the problems 
encumbent upon "chance" by Boutroux's demonstration of 
"contingency." Human life was characterized as 
spontaneous, wherein our consciousness expects "many" 
future possibilities and the present "contains ulways 
enough causality for either. 
choice. 
43 
Ever something new, 
Our living reason makes its 
but never anything entirely 
new." In Boutroux's philosophy of contingency, there was 
a stable pluralism that did not violate the intellectual 
demands of reason. Boutroux's work established an 
important shift in thought. The human mind and the 
environment interact; human reason 




"theories result from psychological variations." For 
117 
James, Boutroux's originality was in "Interpreting the 
whole of nature" from "our own personal experience." 
In 1909 James wrote to Theodore Flournoy, in 
reference to Boutroux, "the times being now fully ready for 
that way of thinking, as they were not when he published 
his first book." Perry put forth the general thesis of 
this paper when referring to James' account of Boutroux in 
The Nation: "In expounding Boutroux's philosophy it is 
45 
evident that he is at the same time expounding his own." 
As we noted, James said exactly that in the article. A 
brief survey of Boutroux's work will indicate the 
importance of the connections between James, Renouvier, 
Bergson, and Blondel. 
Rothwell proclaimed the highest honor on Boutroux for 
46 
having humanized the philosophy and ethics of his day. 
James held that Boutroux explained men of science, 
philosophy and religion to each other. The battle for 
authority between the three was the crisis of the 19th 
47 
Century. Boutroux addressed each of these areas in his 
1874 thesis. Boutroux justified the following assertions, 
in addition to those noted above. Philosophy should be 
grounded on the sciences and should put itself in direct 
touch with the realities of nature and life. Idealist, 
materialist, dualist or parrellelist types of philosophy 
force us to regard laws of nature as a chain of necessity. 
118 
This made liberty an illusion and should be replaced by a 
philosophy that was living and molded on reality. 
Boutroux's intention was "to restore to man his will and 
action," because the processes of nature revealed its 
transcendent character. Nature was living, and developed; 
its laws were contingent and man could rise towards a 
48 
higher life. 
The reality of contingency meant that any particular 
standpoint of understanding was not the ultimate standpoint 
49 
of the knowledge of things. Being occurred as a result 
of the act of choosing between contraries. The act could 
only choose between things derived from experience, 
therefore, being originated only from experience. "The law 
of causality is the synthesis of two mutually irreducible 
50 
elements, change and identity." Science saved man from 
caprice, which was good, but science must not hold 
"exclusive sway" and reduce belief to fatality. 
James specified Boutroux's view of reality, its 
consequences and its source: 
It is the element we wholly live in ... it is the 
superabounding, growing, ever-varying and novelty-
producing. Its real shape is biography and 
history .... the whole undivided jungle, with our 
personal life and all, is the reality immediately 
given ... and more real than ... any conceptual 
substitutes. The great originality of M. Boutroux 
thoughout all these years has been his f irrn grasp 
of the principle of interpreting the whole of 
nature in the light of that part of it with which 
we are most fully acquainted, namely, our own 
personal experience.51 
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In Contingency Boutroux introduced elements seen in 
Bergson, James and Blondel. Boutroux looked at matter, 
things that could be counted reduced to extension and 
motion, "for motion implies duration and produces 
diversity, whence results number." On the other hand, 
notions were discontinuous. 
Time is a continuous duration and motion a 
continuous passing. This idea of continuity, 
restored to the concept of extension, time, and 
motion brushes aside the sophisms into which one is 
led when attributing to these concepts a purely 
logical signification. The mathematical 
properties ... involve a new element, heterogeneous 
and irreducible: continuity.52 
James, Bergson and Blondel develop their philosophies with 
this principle. 
In view of heterogeneous continuity, the idea of 
"facts as necessary" should not be imposed on all of the 
sciences and morality. Sounding very much like James' 
later development of his theory of truth and pluralism, 
Boutroux posited his doctrine of contingency as his thesis. 
The rejection of contingency "would be misjudging the law 
by which, when there is no reason why one of two opposites 
should 
results." 
come about rather then 
53 
the other, nothing 
Boutroux followed the tradition in which Renouvier 
participated and extended. In Contingency Boutroux 
carried the idea of freedom into a newly developed form. 
If things were to be "modified contingently," man must act. 
120 
Freedom was the basis of the "outer sign" of contingency; 
54 
freedom was "creative power, prior to action." All of 
these philosophers of action discussed here have in common 
Boutroux's statement of 1874: 
The mode of knowedge should be suited to the object 
to be known; ... to know the relation between the 
sensible and the suprasensible, there is needed a 
faculty, for which both fact and idea, sign and 
thing signified, cease to be radically distinct. 
Actlon ... reveals to the intellect the reality of 
power or of cause, as the creative and spontaneious 
principle which exists before, during, and after 
its manifestation.55 
Discussing the metaphysical application of Kant's 
thought for Boutroux's contemporary world, he suggested 
that instead of idealism and empiricism (the real and the 
ideal) being on guard against each other, by including each 
other, "politics ceases to be incompatible with morals." 
As for Kant, so for Boutroux: For man, "freedom to think 
cmd make known his thoughts is the condition of the 
56 
progress of enlightenment." W i 11 i am James , Charles 
Renouvier, Henri Bergan, Maurice Blondel and Emile 
Boutroux, as philosophers of action, each sought 
melioration by their intrinsic, empiricist, spiritualistic, 
pluralistic, futuristic philosophies in many respects like 
Kant and in the manner of Pascal's integralism. 
Boutroux captured the essence of these philosophers 
of action: 
Philosophy of knowledge, 
furnish the material, 
for which the 
is not the 
sciences 
whole of 
philosophy. Just as real and legitimate is the 
philosophy of action, life properly so-called, the 
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An enduring fact in the history of philosophy has 
been man's attempt to explain his world and his place in 
it. Philosophy is, then, a vision of the world constructed 
by philosophers who seek to place the multiplicity of facts 
in the experiences of their age in an order that supplies a 
meaningful interpretation. A study of the earliest 
recorded philosophies to those of present day philosophers 
show that they have begun their inquiries by considering 
the philosophic expression of their predecessors in the 
light of their own contemporary experiences. In short, a 
major function of philosophy has been its analysis of 
contemporary problems of society in a particular historical 
period in order to supply an understanding that will lead 
to a more harmonious society where attitudes are consistent 
with contemporary facts and serve as a guide in the proper 
conduct of human affairs. 
An example of the contextual influences that inform 
the development of philosophies can be seen in 
Greek culture where the need for moral guides 





in their relation to the political organization of the 
Greek polis. The classical Greek mentality was shaped and 
focused on man's contributing role in his city state. The 
ritualistic world of an oral culture had gradually given 
way to new socio-economic factors that influenced the 
development of a democratic political structure that 
required individual initiative and a moral philosophy 
enabling the discernment of conduct condusive for the "good 
life." 
In each historical period the history of ideas shows 
that the prevailing philosophy was a product of external 
factors, individual need and intertextual exchange all 
interrelated in the maintenance of a particular philosophy. 
When a philosophy no longer explained the whole of 
realities in a culture, it was superceded by another. 
Ideas are facts that are affected by, and in turn affect, 
the political attitudes and activities of society. It is 
by facing similar facts that philosophers of an age address 





this thesis, we have explored the social 
of the United States and France in the 19th 
Both countries shared a number of basic areas of 
social, political and intellectual instability. These 
areas produced a discordance in the social fabric and thus 
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were an invitation to intellectuals of both countries to 
grapple with the causes and solutions pertinent for their 
age. 
In the United States, post-Civil War reconstruction 
included the national political need to provide a common 
focus for Americans in order to raise political 
consciousness above the level of regional divisions. Along 
with the domestic political needs of the United States, 
there was the desire to become a political power of 
importance 
development 
within the larger international context. The 
of science as a means to promote American 
interests was an important part of the overall political 
agenda. We have focused on the political ramifications 
within institutions of higher education as each strove to 
establish themselves as preeminent academic institutions 
within the international community. The second half of the 
19th Century saw the organization of graduate schools and 
the competition to attract and produce internationally 
recognized scholars. The contributions of science to the 
welfare and prestige legitimized the placement of 
scientific investigations as a primary goal. The problems 
for the pursuit of overall knowledge was the incomplete 
understanding of the nature of scientific investigation. 
The scope and limitations of science concerned 
intellectuals like James, who believed in the efficacy of 
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scientific method but found its intrusion into the 
humanities caused a myopic vision that threatened the 
exercise of intellectual freedom. The debates over Darwin 
exemplify 
physical 
the problems that occurred when facts about the 
nature of the world and man, obtained by 
scientific observation, were employed in theoretical 
explanations of the affective, spiritual and moral life of 
man. 
In France, Renouvier, Bergson, Blondel and Boutroux 
faced an acute situation as the divided groups in national 
politics adopted ideological systems as political tools. 
Unlike the United States, in France the new democratic 
political system was challenged by archaic monarchical 
political convictions. Comte's positive science was 
employed as a political tool to secularize French society. 
I 
The promotion of positivism was a means by which 
republicans could revive the emphasis on reason associated 
with the 1789 French Revolution. 
There was, then, a socio-political basis for using 
positivism to justify the exclusion of the Catholic Church 
from interference in the Republican reconstruction of 
society. The State control of education brought the 
political battles into the universities, thereby, 
threatening intellectual freedom at its center of activity. 
Scholars were intimately involved in national and 
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institutional politics that proved divisive for the 
intellectual community. Men of science, philosophy and 
theology were drawn into political activity as seen in the 
movement of the Action Francsaise, the Catholic 
Modernists, the Neo-Thomists and the Conventionalism of 
, 
Henri Poincare. 
Given the similar societal problems in France and the 
United States, it is not by chance that James, Renouvier, 
Bergson, Blonde! and Boutroux should have developed a 
symbiotic relationship in addressing common problems. 
These five philosophers participated in a reasoned 
development of a philosophic approach based on action. 
This approach sought to understand and explain their 
contemporary 19th Century society that struggled to 
overcome previous authoritative systems and can be seen as 
an identifiable movement. 
This thesis has argued that William James' philosophy 
was to a great extent derived from his interaction with 
these French philosophers and that in order to understand 
James' philosophy, he must be placed within the context of 
these relations. My primary concern has been the 
philosophy of William James. However, it is important to 
mention some of the references by these French philosophers 
to James. Renouvier reprinted at least nine of James' 
essays in the French journal La Critique Philosophigue. 
132 
Bergson wrote the Introduction to the French translation of 
Pragmatism and the Introduction to the French translation 
1 
of James' letters. Boutroux included a chapter on James 
in his Science and Religion in Contemporary Society and 
2 
wrote a biography of James. 
To more fully understand James' philosophy this 
thesis has presented the ideas derived from these French 
philosophers. As noted by his own remarks, James' direct 
relationship with each is indisputable. The elements of 
his philosophy derived from his exchange with them should 
be summarized. By his adoption of Renouvier's conception 
of free will, James broke with monistic philosophies that 
presented closed systems of thought. James placed an act 
of self affirmation as the heart of any philosophic system, 
which put him in the camp of open, pluralistic philosophies 
that included choice. 
James adopted Renouvier's phenomenal ism, which 
included the relations between things in a given context, 
3 
which James called the "new empiricism." For James, 
ideas, will, and action were instrumental in the 
construction of any philosophy, which meant that there was 
a subjective element. James' pluralism was based on 
Renouvier's view that "the whole is an expression of the 
interaction of originally independent forces," which 
accounts for James' preference for the priority of part to 
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whole. By starting from Renouvier's voluntary belief, 
James proposed that the consequences of action on belief 
would either verify or invalidate the truth of an original 
hypothesis. The notion of free will carried the seeds of 
James subsequent development of his pragmatism. Rather 
than giving primacy to conception or perception, James 
viewed both as interrelated activity. By these assertions, 
Jdmes employed a Nee-Kantian emphasis on the practical rule 
that included empiricism and ideals for future action in 
his conception of moral philosophy. 
The problem of dualism, which separated the subject 
and object was overcome by his exchange of ideas with Henri 
Bergson. The logic of identity derived from mathematical 
equations which held that the idea and the thing must be 
identical equivalencies. The problem that arose from the 
application of logic to experience resided in the fact that 
two people could know (have in mind) the same object. Did 
the object then have two realities? 
Bergson held that the logic of identity was a static 
picture of experience that only occurred in discourse. In 
actuality, all experiences came undivided and flowed in a 
continuous fashion into one another. There was no 
separation between the subject and object until man's 
interest determined which was to be attended to. Pure 
experience was given and the pluralism of choices meant 
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that life was a continuous process of creative becoming. 
By this, James was able to solve the problem of co-
consciousness and develop a metaphysics consonant with 
experiential life. Knowledge was not simply thought 
relations, but was a function of cognition which included 
"thinking-feeling-consciousness" in a process of 
interaction. His Radical Empiricism meant that reality was 
a pluralism wherein series of phenomena could be 
interrupted and a new series begun. This last point had 
been present in James' thought due to the influence of 
Renouvier. By his relation with Bergson, James was finally 
able to construct its metaphysical explanation. 
The continuous creative movement of life meant that 
each moment was self-transcendent. Consequently, novelty 
was possible without abandoning the concrete facts of law-
in-change. Understanding the way concepts cut up the 
movement of life allowed the placement of conceptual 
constructions in their as guides for future action. A 
4 
metaphysics of action could go beyond conceptual science. 
The choice between absolute idealism and empiricism was no 
longer a valid question from the viewpoint of the 
interrelations of all action, which included the activities 
5 
of thinking and feeling in a doctrine of compenetration. 
Blondel's technical presentation of a philosophy of 
action showed how consciousness exercises itself in 
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freedom. He equated the will with voluntary aspiration and 
showed that in practice empiricism and idealism were 
united. In reality, thought and life were not separable. 
By Blondel's demonstration of philosophy as starting with 
direct knowledge and constructing plans that evoked the 
future that was conceived, he showed that a practical 
philosophy recognized retrospective conceptualization and 
prospective plans. James referred the readers of 
Pragmatism to Blondel's work for a further understanding of 
philosophy as the real within the real; philosophy was not 
separate from life, it was a part of life taken in its 
totality. Quoting Blondel in A Pluralistic Universe, James 
maintained that theory and action work in the same circle 
indefinitely. From this, James held that the pluralistic 
6 
philosophy saw the universe as self-reparative. 
Following the philosophic tradition of which 
Renouvier was a part, in 1874 Boutroux put forward the 
conceptions that were in part to appear in the work of 
these philosophers of action. Against exclusive 
abstraction and the reductionism of Corntism, or scientism, 
that viewed reality in mechanistic terms, Boutroux rescued 
reason from tracing identities. Boutroux's conception of 
contingency explained novelty without requiring that 
absolute chaos be admitted. This problem had bothered 
James since the 1870's when he had adopted free will and 
tychism (chance). With Boutroux, James 
"chance" in favor of a clearer conception 





notions to unity. For James, Boutroux was the leader in 
interpreting the whole of nature from man's personal 
experience. Boutroux's conception of the law of causality 
as the synthesis of "two irreducible elements, change and 
identity," allowed for science and belief. He demonstrated 
that science must not hold "exclusive sway." James' 
advocacy of both science and religion, each on their own 
terms, found its expression in Boutroux's thought. 
Each of the philosophers of action sought to 
meliorate the opposing positions of philosophical schools 
that proposed an anti-metaphysical positivism or an 
absolute idealism, by placing both within experience 
understood by the nature of action. As philosophers of 
action, they each contributed to the humanization of the 
philosophy and ethics of their day. By making philosophy a 
life and not a view, "a practice and not a theory of 
practice", they "renewed the meaning of philosophic 
7 
activity itself." A philosophy of action, as a moral 
philosophy, advocates the moral education of the individual 
in his inextricable relations with the collective. 
Intellectual freedom required the recognition of the 
multiplicity of experience and devising a method particular 
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to the object of knowledge, rather than imposing one method 
on all inquiry. By abandoning the exclusive view of 
scientism in philosophy, and proceeding from the viewpoint 
of action, the world of knowledge would be open and 
growing. 
In Some Problems of Philosophy, James reiterated the 
points this thesis has stressed as providing a more 
complete understanding of his philosophy. His pluralism 
replaced the conception of a universe with one of a 
"multiverse." Pluralism meant free will. The ontolo<3ical 
problem, "or question of how there comes to be anything at 
all" was really a question of gradual growth. "The 
conditions of its appearance are uncertain, unforeseeable, 
8 
when future, and when past, elusive." There would be 
novelty, which concepts could not apprehend in advance; 
however, concepts were effective in science and as ideal 
constructions of future human experience. 
The advantage of pluralism was that it could 
accommodate monistic views but monism could not accommodate 
pluralistic views. Pluralism was melioristic by not 
excluding a variety of views. With pluralism, the world 
"may be saved on condition that its parts shall do their 
best." Pluralism was, therefore, more moral. Pluralism 
did not reject science nor did it reject life. James' 
melioristic universe was "conceived after a social analogy, 
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as a pluralism of independent powers. It will succeed just 
9 
in proportion as more of these work for its success." Its 
character was hypothetical and men were the creators of the 
worlds conclusion by their action on belief prior to 
certitude. 
James summarized his vision of reality: 
reality is flowing,--truth is an aid to action, a 
guiding thread by which man finds his way and keeps 
his footing in the mist of perceptual novelty. 
While for other philosophies truth is a 
'discovery', for pragmatism it is an 'invention'.10 
For James, truth was a function of reality. His co-
operative universe held that it was only by man's 
"precursive" trust that the making of a perfected world 
11 
could ever come into being. His whole philosophy follows 
Pascal's expression of "Two errors: 1. to take everything 
12 
literally, 2. to take everything spiritually." 
By looking at the texts of this period, we can see 
the contextual nature of knowledge. The society and the 
philosophy of these five philosophers of action were both 
pluralistic. By saying that all of our theories are 
instrumental, James did not mean to say that theories are 
true because they are useful; rather, James meant that a 
theory is sustained according to its correspondence with 
life as it is experienced. The degree to which it does not 
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